Power System Blueprint

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Accomplishing climate neutrality by 2050 requires a zero-emissions power sector by the mid-2030s. Securing a decarbonized power system early will unlock pathways for the whole economy. One of the biggest challenges to accomplishing this ambitious goal is time—we have a need for speed if we want to meet decarbonization goals by 2035.  

This is why RAP has created the Power System Blueprint, an interactive website that allows visitors to view different options for decarbonizing Europe’s power system. The Blueprint lays out how to design the regulatory context to achieve a clean, reliable, equitable and affordable European power system by 2035. RAP pulled together the latest insights for supporting regulators, NGO’s, governments and anyone interested in the decarbonization pursuit. 

The Blueprint is designed as a schematic of regulatory solutions linked to six important central principles. In the suite of regulatory solutions (also known as factsheets),you will find comprehensive information, the most important regulatory steps and further reading. 

The decarbonization of the power sector can be done by 2035 but will require a rapid and systemic rethink of the existing European power system regulatory landscape. Within the Power System Blueprint website, you’ll find solutions to some of the some of the largest tasks we face working within this tight timeframe.   

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A Strategic Clean Flexible Load Reserve

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​At a UC Davis Energy and Efficiency Institute meeting, Carl Linvill discussed flexible load as a grid resource and highlighted steps to build an effective strategic flexible load reserve.

A Song in the Key of E: Emissions, Efficiency, Equity, and Electrification

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A lot of folks out there (including we at RAP) have, for the last four decades, been devising ways to make utilities more economically efficient, their customers more energy-efficient, and the power system cleaner, sustainable, more equitable, and non-emitting. But now they have a problem: the world has changed, and suddenly we need more of that thing that they for so long tried to constrain. Now that the time has finally come to make the leap that has to be made if our climate crisis is to be solved, we’re like the proverbial deer in the headlights — if only for a moment. The prospect of wild load growth in electric demand is a bit hard to swallow at first. It’s both frightening and, well, electrifying.

Efficiency has been the central theme of electric sector reform for nearly a half century. It is the recognition that meeting a society’s energy needs is not simply a matter of “more is better” but rather of “no more than is necessary (and it’d better be as environmentally benign as possible).” This insight meant that we should not use energy when it was cheaper and more valuable to save it. And it meant that the traditional business model of the monopoly electric utility had to change—that profitability could no longer be linked to growth in commodity sales but to the least-cost provision of energy service and achievement of express public policy objectives.

So what’s the problem?

Well, it turns out that we need more, lots more, of a particular kind of energy — electricity from non-emitting resources — if we’re going to decarbonize as much of the economy as we possibly can. We need clean electricity for transportation, heating and cooling, agriculture, and industry. Are the regulatory reforms that we’ve advanced in the past thirty-odd years — in particular, integrated resource planning, revenue decoupling, and systems of performance-based rewards and penalties — appropriate to a vision that calls for a great expansion in our use of electricity and therefore a sea change in how we produce and deliver it?

The answer is yes, and it shouldn’t surprise us. It follows directly from an approach to economic analysis and policy — aimed at maximizing the net societal benefits of energy use — that we’ve relied on for decades. Thirty years ago, given the costs, expectations, and constraints we faced, the analyses pointed us in certain directions. Today, given different costs, expanded expectations, and more urgent constraints, they point us in new directions. In both cases, they told us how to minimize the costs — that is, maximize the benefits — of our desired path.

At a conceptual level, the problem isn’t daunting. It’s time to truly look at the energy system in its entirety, not just the electric system. How do we minimize the total costs of energy production and use, while meeting our climate, economic, and social goals?

It’s simple. The least-cost path is characterized by massive fuel-switching — from fossil fuels to clean, emissions-free sources, primarily electricity. But it’s not that simple. It doesn’t relieve us of the duty to make sure those new loads are as efficient as possible and are managed as efficiently as possible — indeed, it insists upon it, since any waste only increases costs. It isn’t right simply to say “Electrify!” How we electrify matters.

The good news is that our planning tools and regulatory methods are up to the task. We know how to think about the problem, consider alternatives, test uncertain futures. We know how to change course when circumstances dictate. And we know that utilities and market actors respond to the forces that act upon them, which means that we should still care deeply about whether their private financial incentives align with the public interest. We want these players to be successful by doing the right things.

So what does this mean for the utility business model? For the “wires” sides of the business — transmission and distribution — in both vertically integrated and competitively restructured markets, there’s still every reason to remove the “throughput incentive.” Whether load is growing or not, a utility whose revenues and profits are a direct function of kilowatt-hour sales (that is, of kWh deliveries) has a very powerful incentive to encourage usage, even if that usage is inefficient. We shouldn’t think that, simply because the electricity is clean, we have license to be profligate. The recent decision of the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities to scrap Eversource’s decoupling regime, on the grounds that good ol’ fashioned price-only regulation will encourage the company to promote electrification. Probably it will, but, alas, it won’t give the utility much, if any, reason to care whether the electrification is in the best interests of society.

Revenue decoupling remains a critical element of a regulatory regime that aims for least-cost investment in, and operation of, the grid. It keeps the regulated monopoly focused on efficient operations. But, by itself, it doesn’t guarantee utility enthusiasm for preferred outcomes. Legal and regulatory obligations go a long way to solving that problem, but there’s a place for carrots and sticks too. Performance measures, with achievement rewards and penalties, overlaid on a decoupling mechanism, are powerful drivers of policy objectives.

What about the commodity side of the business? Again, in both vertically integrated and restructured markets, investment has been and will continue to be propelled in significant measure by policy requirements, such as renewable portfolio standards and emissions reductions requirements (e.g., cap-and-invest programs). These have been effective in transforming our resource portfolios and, moreover, have helped drive deep cost reductions in clean energy technologies, so that now the relative costs begin to favor the preferred investments. Important wholesale market reforms are still needed, but the outlook is good.

In those places where utilities remain vertically integrated, the question of how power costs should be recovered is of acute interest, especially where price risk has been shifted to consumers by means of fuel adjustment clauses and power-cost pass-throughs. How these mechanisms, intended to insulate shareholders from the volatility of global energy prices, distort management imperatives to manage power costs and investment for the long-term good of both consumers and shareholders has been well understood for decades. It’s time to revisit these tools, to consider whether and how they can be reformed to better align private incentives with the public good. Utilities and other load-serving entities possess the comparative advantage for bearing price, climate, and other market risks. Some simple fixes to power-cost recovery mechanisms will go a long way to reordering those risks and creating the environment in which clean, reliable electricity flourishes.

By all means, let’s let utilities and other market actors make money providing the energy and energy services we want. And that includes where increased load is societally most efficient—which is to say, the least-cost means of meeting demand for reliable, equitable service and, among other things, our climate goals.

Stay tuned for more blogs in this series. We’ll dig into some of the knottier regulatory challenges that large growth in load raises and try to answer the question: “Just what does a regulatory scheme look like that promises to achieve these ends?”


Comments Off on 国际视野:对创建“全国统一电力市场”的下一步工作建议

近日,国家发展改革委、国家能源局发布了《关于加快建设全国统一电力市场体系的指导意见》 (发改体改〔2022〕118)。该文件为电力市场改革又向前迈出了重要一步,比如,该政策中制定了总体目标,要求在2025年前,国家市场与省(区、市)/区域市场协同运行,电力中长期、现货、辅助服务市场一体化设计、联合运营。同时,还提出优化电力市场总体设计”,“建设全国统一的电力市场体系,统一交易规则和技术标准等关于电力市场建设的要求。 


  • 以统一的算法优化区域调度的区域现货市场,是清洁能源转型的重要组成部分 
  • 中长期合同利用金融手段比物理手段更灵活、更利于可再生能源发电并网 
  • 电力现货市场的一个关键功能是在调度决策中反映不同资源的真实边际成本 
  • 输电定价不应成为统一区域市场和调度的壁垒 
  • 支持发电机容量成本回收的措施应谨慎加以限制。 



Price shock absorber: Temporary electricity price relief during times of gas market crisis

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European policymakers are weighing possible responses to the extraordinary surge in energy prices and the consequences for citizens and industry. The European Commission expects to issue additional guidance in May, following analysis due in April from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. Targeted relief to vulnerable consumers should be undertaken in any case. Whilst RAP would urge caution in considering possible broader interventions in the electricity markets, if such a course of action is under serious consideration, we offer this proposal of a ‘price shock absorber’ for reflection as a measure best fit for purpose, designed to acknowledge and address the essential aspects of the current crisis:

  • This is a gas market crisis — it is an extraordinary event that is adversely affecting all sectors of Europe’s economy. The priority for the electricity sector must be measures that allow the electricity market to ride through this shock to the system, and similar future shocks, preserving its functionality whilst avoiding undue harm to consumers.
  • The midst of a crisis is the wrong time to take decisions with long-term implications that will be difficult to walk back once the crisis has passed. Our proposal acknowledges that the fundamental design of the electricity market is sound; whilst improvements are certainly needed, they have no direct bearing on the causes of or remedies for this crisis.
  • This crisis has revealed in stark terms the true cost of dependence on a volatile fossil gas market, including the risks inherent in the prominent position Russia will continue to occupy in global supply.
  • Consumers and industry have the power to contribute to the response to these risks, by procuring the energy services they need more efficiently and flexibly.

When responding to the crisis, policymakers should preserve and even intensify the electricity market’s role in mobilising and empowering consumers rather than concealing the true cost of ‘business as usual.’ The value of the only durable response — an accelerated transition away from fossil fuels — must remain visible to consumers in an equitable fashion.

The authors outline this price shock absorber mechanism as an additional market feature to bring consumers some measure of relief whilst preserving the market’s essential functions. These include valuing energy efficiency, rewarding beneficial demand and resource flexibility and ensuring a ‘normal’ level of expected inframarginal rent to incentivise and compensate investors in the energy transition for the value of their investments. If a decision is taken to intervene broadly in the electricity market, we suggest this approach offers a significant measure of relief whilst doing the least harm.


Indian power sector has opportunities to create value for the discoms and their consumers by mainstreaming behind-the-meter resources

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The electricity sector in India has experienced an evolution of sorts throughout the years. Since the early the 1990s, the sector has grown from a vertically integrated monopoly with generation, transmission, and distribution all under one roof, to the current structure in accord with the Electricity Act of 2003 where the three have been unbundled and now operate separately. The Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) has made substantial progress towards promoting end-use efficiency with more than 15% savings demonstrated in the appliance-level energy use with its labelling and standards plans. The Indian power sector has created a conducive environment for renewable energy generators: as of 31 January 2022, renewables constituted 26.8% of the nation’s total installed capacity of 370 GW. The politics of subsidised or free electricity to a certain category of consumers, a legacy practice followed by the distribution companies (discoms), puts undue pressure on the entire power sector’s financial health.

The four charts below show Average Billing Rate (ABR),* Aggregated Revenue Requirement (ARR),** revenue gap (difference between the average cost of supply (ACS) and ARR, and Aggregated Technical and Commercial (AT&C) losses for discoms in major states.*** 

The distribution sector in India is also struggling. As of March 2021, the sector owes over INR 85,000 Crores (approx. U.S. $12 billion) to the generation companies. Discoms depend on the commercial and industrial (C&I) consumer base to subsidise the agriculture and the low-volume domestic customer classes, as seen in the difference between energy sales and revenues in the figure below.

Source: PFC, 2019

The C&I consumers will continue to provide the lion’s share of discom revenues, even if they take advantage of “open access” (the freedom to buy power from sources other than the incumbent discoms), because they are nevertheless required to pay high cross-subsidy surcharges and wheeling charges (power distribution charges). It’s important to retain such consumers within the incumbent discoms with key objectives of promoting higher renewable energy shares in the power mix, as well as reducing the electricity use with a deeper portfolio of energy efficient end-use practices. The discoms’ heavy dependence on C&I consumers to generate sufficient revenues creates significant barriers to decarbonisation investment opportunities among these consumers.

C&I consumers have an intrinsic need to reduce their power costs. Open access is a powerful opportunity for these consumers. So too are on-site efficiency and distributed resources, but such behind-the-meter investments are not encouraged by the discoms, given the threat of reduced revenues that they pose. Along those same lines, behind-the-meter generation (rooftop photovoltaic) within the consumer base is not easy to implement without on-site storage options or net metering/renewable energy export opportunities provided by the discoms. In several states, net metering policies do not favour the consumers creating large capacities to be exported to the grid beyond their diurnal requirements. It’s also opportune to deepen the behind-the-meter renewable energy and energy efficiency portfolio, combined with the storage solutions, at the consumer categories that are heavily subsidised.

One key opportunity to be explored in creating a substantive renewable energy, efficiency and storage portfolio on both sides of the meters is the possibility of discoms doubling up to become new energy service providers as much as legally possible. We hypothesise the possibility of developing a stronger efficiency, renewables, demand-responsive, end-use consumption, with adequate thermal and battery storage solutions at the consumer-side of the meter amongst all the customer categories.

Our team is currently exploring the efficacy and benefit-costs of discoms and consumers co-investing in behind-the-meter efficiency, dispersed solar, storage and demand-responsive end-use consumption patterns. We’re also researching in detail the regulatory regime that allows such investments, the benefit-costs of making investments in the behind-the-meter efficiency and renewables assets, and existing enhanced power sales opportunities through the possibility of selling saved energy for newer uses, such as electric vehicles. Other key benefits of enhanced renewable energy assets on the customer side of meter is the possibility of exporting renewable energy sources to other regions through an aggregated sale on the exchanges. More to come.

*ABR is calculated as ABR = Revenue expected from all categories million Rs /Approved sales in MU. The data has been obtained from the latest ARR of the respective utilities.

**This is the approved ARR for the upcoming year for the respective utilities. 

***Discom key:

  • Maharashtra: MSEDCL
  • Punjab: PSCPL
  • Karnataka: BESCOM
  • Tamil Nadu: TANGEDCO


Comments Off on 电力现货市场风险管理:发电运行成本分析、电力现货市场监测、市场力筛选和减缓

国际经验表明,电力市场,特别是电力现货市场,很容易受到操纵,从而导致增加不必要的成本和排放,降低系统效率。在电力短缺和输电系统阻塞时,这些问题将更加突出。随着现货市场在全国范围内的发展,完善市场监管的需求将继续增长。总的来说,在欧洲、美国以及世界其他地区,电力市场在很多不同的方面受到密切的监管 。本文以美国为例 ,主要从发电运行成本分析、电力市场监测、市场力筛选和减缓等方面进行分析,以期对中国电力现货市场提供参考。