Decoupling Case Studies: Revenue Regulation Implementation in Six States

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1 We use the technical term revenue regulation rather than decoupling for two reasons. First, the term decoupling has multiple meanings within the utility sector, with some natural gas utilities using this term to describe rate designs that recover all distribution costs in fixed, recurring charges (typically monthly), an approach that is inconsistent with the long-run economics of the regulated energy sectors and, specifically, with the economics of end-use energy efficiency. Second, the term decoupling has multiple meanings outside the utility sector, most notably the description of an economy growing at a different (faster) rate than the rate of energy consumption, a circumstance that is quite consistent with the goals (and, indeed, generally describes the effects) of investment in energy efficiency, but it does not describe a specific ratemaking regime. Revenue regulation, or “revenue cap regulation,” in which the regulator establishes an allowed revenue requirement and adjusts collections so as to achieve that allowed, or “target,” revenue irrespective of actual sales, is well understood as distinct from traditional “price” (sometimes “price cap”) regulation, in which the regulator sets a price and lets revenues vary with sales volume. Revenue regulation is one type in the broad category of performance-based regulation.
List of Acronyms

BGE Baltimore Gas and Electric
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission
C&I Commercial and Industrial
DG Distributed Generation
DPU Department of Public Utilities
DSM Demand-Side Management
FCA Fixed Cost Adjustment
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Practices
GRC General Rate Case
HECO Hawaiian Electric Company
IPC Idaho Power Company
kWh Kilowatt-Hour
MECO Maui Electric Company
O&M Operation and Maintenance
PCA Power Cost Adjustment
PGE Portland General Electric
PG&E Pacific Gas and Electric
PSC Public Service Commission
PSCW Public Service Commission of Wisconsin
RAM Revenue Adjustment Mechanism
RBA Revenue Balancing Account
ROE Return on Equity
RPC Revenue Per Customer
RSM Revenue Stabilization Mechanism
TOU Time-Of-Use
WPS Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

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Introduction: Policy Overview for Decoupling

Over the last several decades there have been major shifts away from the traditional utility service paradigm in which the local utility supplied customers with all their resource needs, and those resource needs were met through the construction and operation of power plants. Some states have restructured their electric utilities so that the resource supply is a competitive service. Others have maintained the traditional vertically integrated model, while other states have developed hybrids combining features of each. Also different today is the expectation that the customer demand for electricity will be provided exclusively from power plants. Energy efficiency as a substitute for new power plants to meet customer needs has been gaining acceptance in the regulatory world, significantly during the last decade. Moreover, as the price of renewable resources used for distributed generation (DG) continues to decline, there has been a growth in the adoption of on-site generation by customers as they demand a more diverse set of services. The potential for deployment of customer-side resources of all types is large.

Traditional regulatory practice creates an environment in which the utility is able to earn more profit by selling more electricity. Because of this dynamic, the utility is essentially in competition with the customer, as well as with private sector companies that provide services, to supply the energy needs of that customer. This can greatly impede the ability of the marketplace to achieve the optimal least-cost solution for energy services. A regulatory scheme that depends on increasing throughput as a means for achieving earnings is likely to be increasingly out of step with customer needs and desires—and with public policy objectives—in the coming years. As the utility service environment changes, so too must regulation as customers demand more and different services and as regulators increasingly encourage clean energy outcomes. The growth in customer-sided resource options compounds the challenge of net lost distribution revenues for utilities, especially as it affects their ability to maintain and upgrade their grid infrastructure. Thus, as nontraditional resources (that are neither supply options nor provided by the utility) are proliferating, revenue regulation, while not a silver bullet, becomes even more important as a means of managing revenues and removing utility barriers to adoption of these alternatives.

Although the concept of increasing energy efficiency and DG may be fairly straightforward, the impact and reaction of electric utilities to engage in comprehensive energy efficiency and encourage DG is not. Ask any business how it makes money and it will invariably respond that it does so through increasing the number of units of the products it is selling, through growth. Energy efficiency requires utilities to do the exact opposite of the traditional model, and instead requires the utility to market and promote buying less of its product. The net lost revenues that the utility will encounter as a result of these activities is no trivial matter, especially as energy efficiency programs ramp up. Many states have Energy Efficiency Resource Standards requiring cumulative reductions in consumption by 20 to 25 percent in the 2020 decade. Others have commission-ordered energy efficiency portfolio requirements, requiring similar reductions in consumption. A new study cosponsored by The Edison Foundation Institute for Electric Innovation found that electric utility efficiency programs saved 126 terawatt-hours of electricity in 2012. If utilities were unable to collect two cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) contribution to fixed costs as a result of these efficiency program savings, they would experience a significant reduction in returns.

The growth in DG will also impact utility sales, and have a similar impact on revenue as energy efficiency. According to a Bloomberg report, financial investments in DG have grown from $19 billion in 2004 to $143 billion in 2010.
The onsite energy production from these investments will decrease utility sales from what they otherwise would have been, and could result in absolute decreases in sales in states that have strong energy efficiency programs and low baseline growth. As states pursue a more aggressive efficiency agenda, there might come a point where the current rate-setting model is no longer sustainable. Utilities have embedded investment-related and labor costs (not sensitive to volume)\(^4\) included in their rates to support investments already made and necessary for good service, reliability, safety, and other utility services, which are adjusted during periodic rate cases. Without a mechanism in place to address the utility impact of reduced sales, the lost revenues from energy efficiency programs and DG will make it more difficult for utilities to cover their fixed cost obligations and to reach their earnings targets for shareholders. As a result, various strategies to allow utilities to recapture these lost revenues have been developed. Environmental imperatives, including promotion of customer-side alternatives to utility supply, motivate regulators to consider forms of regulation in which sales do not matter and utilities are motivated to find the best investments to meet public policy objectives irrespective of which side of the meter it resides or what degree of utility control is maintained.

Lost revenue recovery allows utilities to recover the deficit in revenue resulting from reduced sales.\(^5\) There are several mechanisms that accomplish this: lost revenue adjustment mechanisms, straight-fixed variable rates, and revenue regulation. Only one of these mechanisms, decoupling - revenue regulation, however, accomplishes the dual goals of both removing the throughput incentive and continuing to send more economically appropriate price signals to customers. Both of these principles are key to successful energy efficiency programs.\(^6\)

Revenue regulation, however, is a not a single distinct mechanism. Rather, there are various elements that can be assembled in numerous ways based on state priorities and preferences that serve to eliminate the throughput incentive. This publication will focus on six utilities: Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Idaho Power Company, Pacific Northwest Energy Group, Tennessee Valley Authority, Puget Sound Energy, and Consumers Energy.

\(^4\) Technically, the only truly “fixed” costs for a utility are interest and depreciation. Labor costs are technically variable costs, but they vary little in the short-run in response to sales volumes. Over a long time, one or more decades, some costs that are fixed in the short-term, such as transformers and conductors, are revealed to be volume- and usage-sensitive, especially when assets and systems are replaced.

\(^5\) Strictly speaking, it is not lost revenue that is at issue. To the extent that avoided sales avoid some amount of variable cost (low in the case of delivery services only), that avoided cost should be netted from the foregone gross revenue, in order to calculate the correct amount of revenue that would have otherwise gone to cover the company’s return of and return on investment. Revenue regulation solves this problem automatically. In contrast, lost revenue adjustments require these calculations, which predictably become quite contentious in the rate-making process.

\(^6\) Although this paper does not focus on the rationale for sending appropriate price signals, references on this issue can be found at: Lazar, J., Schwartz, L., and Allen, R. (2011) Pricing Do’s and Don’ts. Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project. Available at: www.raponline.org/docs/RAP_Lazar_PricingDosandDonts_2011_04.pdf, and Lazar et al. (2011).

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Wisconsin Public Service Company, National Grid, and Hawaiian Electric Company, and the different forms of revenue regulation their regulators have implemented. These examples provide a range of options on how to implement revenue regulation. After considering the decoupling mechanisms of numerous utilities across the nation, these specific utilities were chosen in order to provide examples across many regions, and also to contrast the different approaches taken by each utility to provide a broader overview of the options available in designing decoupling mechanisms and to describe how they have worked.

**Background: Measuring the Success of Decoupling/Revenue Regulation Mechanisms**

A revenue regulation mechanism designed to promote energy efficiency may be viewed as successful if the utility is no longer concerned about increases and decreases in sales, is no longer taking actions to increase sales or reduce decreases in sales, and is improving the overall efficiency of its operations and management. Although a particular mechanism can be designed to meet other goals (other performance goals, with dedicated metrics and specific rewards and penalties attached), this paper is primarily concerned with mechanisms designed to mitigate revenue losses that can impede the desire of a utility to aggressively pursue programmatic energy efficiency. By taking an in-depth look at six diverse utilities that have implemented revenue regulation, this study describes the similarities and differences among the adopted mechanisms and attempts to answer the question of how each is working to achieve its goals.

A second significant determinant of the success of a revenue regulation mechanism is its acceptance by the stakeholders. This can be manifested by a lack of objection or support of revenue regulation by consumers and it can be manifested through changes in utility behavior that customers respond to. Revenue regulation provides utilities who act prudently and in accordance with the mechanism assurance that they will collect their allowed revenues. As a result, they are better able to focus on other activities, such as programmatic energy efficiency, that reduces costs in the long run. The utilities studied also found benefits to include providing customers with a lower-cost product, improved customer interaction, and other efforts as sanctioned by the regulator that will produce additional revenue streams. Indeed, the Oregon Commission recognized as much when it commented on Portland General Electric’s (PGE) ability to influence individual customers through direct contacts and referrals. The Commission also noted that PGE can influence usage depending on how aggressively it pursues DG; whether it supports improvements to building codes; and whether it provides timely, useful information on energy efficiency programs. Engaging actively in these programs can also help develop better customer relationships as the utility industry evolves to a more service-oriented business. Instead of just handing customers a bill, the utility can be providing them efficiency-based solutions that serve cumulatively to avoid more expensive ways to meet customer demand.

Financial incentives for specified performance—relating to energy efficiency achievements or improvements in customer service, to name only two—are examples of ways to influence utility behavior in furtherance of public policy objectives. If awarded, such incentives are included in periodic adjustments to the allowed revenue. One goal is to turn the utility from being a reluctant participant to being an enthusiastic advocate for (or at least not an active inhibitor of) energy efficiency while creating a stable regulatory environment to accomplish other complementary policies. Moreover, combining revenue regulation with performance incentives creates a stronger inducement for utilities to engage in least-cost planning, which benefits its customers.

Environmental groups will want to ensure that there are robust programs and policies in place that advance clean energy solutions. Consumers will be cautious about rate impacts that will need to be addressed in the design of a decoupling mechanism (see text box on next page).

Striking a balance among competing stakeholder concerns while creating effective mechanisms to advance good public policy falls to the regulators and, as will be seen in the six case studies, there seems to be no generally accepted approach. This demonstrates that revenue regulation is not a static, one-size-fits-all policy, but rather it can be fashioned in a number of ways to meet the needs of any given community.

An additional way to evaluate the success of a revenue regulation mechanism is to look at the rate impacts and how manageable they are. Most annual rate impacts from revenue regulation fall between plus or minus one to three

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Some consumer groups have expressed concerns with decoupling, because, depending on how it is designed, there could be future rate adjustments that are not subject to the same rigorous review as would occur in a rate case. Below is a list of considerations in designing revenue regulation mechanism that attempts to address those concerns:

- Making revenue regulation contingent on a robust energy efficiency commitment and portfolio;
- Requiring structural symmetry in the mechanism, such that credits as well as surcharges flowing from a reconciliation be accounted for and refunded to customers;
- Creating a bandwidth around the amount of adjustment permitted in any given year;
- Adjusting the cost of capital or, more appropriately, the imputed capital structure, to reflect lower risk; and,
- Requiring periodic rate cases to assess the appropriate level of revenues for the utility—which is helpful only if the utility’s revenue requirement is set too high and does not account for downward adjustments in costs such as reduced labor expense.

percent. These impacts are generally manageable and may in fact be less than the fluctuations customers might otherwise experience with fuel adjustment clauses or under a variable generation rate. Over the long term, observers might expect to note avoided load-driven capital costs and other long-lived commitments.

Another measurement of the success of decoupling is how the results of its implementation are viewed by financial institutions. Revenue regulation can be a factor considered by the rating agencies in determining a bond rating for a utility. With multiple mergers and the creation of holding companies with subsidiaries, it becomes more difficult to measure this because there are multiple utility companies and affiliates in multiple states that are being evaluated. Nevertheless, Standard and Poors noted that revenue regulation mechanisms were a positive factor and that they would better align the interests of consumers with utility shareholders by implementing rate designs that encourage energy efficiency.

Because revenue regulation reduces the utility’s risk profile by providing revenue and earnings stability, the upside can be a better credit rating from the major rating agencies. Alternatively, the utility may be able to retain the existing credit rating with a lower common equity ratio in its capital structure. A better credit rating or lower equity ratio can translate into a lower financing rate, which benefits the utility and ultimately the customers who pay for utility-financed construction projects.

These construction projects can include distribution and transmission upgrades or expansion as well as pollution control investments on existing generating units or, if necessary, new plant construction.

Finally, a more tangible means of ascertaining the success of a revenue regulation mechanism is whether there is an increase in energy efficiency and DG. Although some of the incremental increases may be motivated by statutory or regulatory requirements, a utility decision to increase or voluntarily go beyond the requirements through its own efforts or by assisting others, especially if innovative means are used to achieve these results, can be viewed as a demonstration that revenue regulation is working.

This publication contains an in-depth look at six instances of revenue regulation, representing a wide cross-section of such regimes in the United States. We look first at each utility and provide a summary of its revenue regulation mechanism. Next we discuss various components or decision points in designing a revenue regulation mechanism and look at how each state addressed that mechanism. What emerges is that despite the differences in designing revenue regulation, each mechanism is customized so that the pieces and parts fit together into a complete tableau. This is perhaps one of the most critical lessons to be drawn from these analyses, that is, that there is no one right way to do revenue regulation. What counts most is making sure that all the parts of a revenue regulation mechanism work together.
**California: Pacific Gas and Electric Company**

Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (PG&E) revenue regulation mechanism compares authorized revenues plus annual attrition adjustments with non–weather-adjusted actual revenues and reconciles any over- or under-collection annually. The authorized revenues are established through a general rate case every three years based on a future test year. Each of PG&E’s functional operating areas is decoupled and the authorized revenue requirement is determined separately for each unit: electric distribution, gas distribution, public purpose programs, and the like. During the general rate case, authorized revenues are also established for the two years following the future test year. Each year, an “attrition case” measures changes in the approved costs that have been experienced, and adjusts the test-year revenue requirement. Collected revenue is tracked through balancing accounts, and surpluses/deficits in these accounts are amortized and refunded/collected to or from ratepayers through rate adjustments in the following year. Revenue regulation applies collectively to all of PG&E’s customer classes (i.e., deviations in sales revenues relative to forecasted levels are tracked and reconciled at the system level). The revenue regulation mechanism is in addition to adjustments for PG&E’s electric and gas energy procurement costs.

**Authority**

California first adopted revenue regulation for gas utilities in 1978. By 1982, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) put revenue regulation in place for its three major electric investor-owned utilities, PG&E, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas & Electric. The original construct, called the Electric Revenue Adjustment Mechanism, established a revenue requirement for each utility annually and then reconciled billed revenues to authorized revenues. The Commission determined that the mechanism would “eliminate any disincentives PG&E may have to promote vigorous conservation measures and also be fair to ratepayers in assuring that PG&E receives no more or no less than the level of revenues intended to be earned.”¹⁰ However, the CPUC largely suspended the electric revenue regulation mechanisms in 1996 owing to the implementation of electric restructuring.

In 2001, the California Assembly passed Assembly Bill 29, which established programs to reduce energy usage in the wake of the Western Energy Crisis and required that “[t]he commission shall ensure that errors in estimates of demand elasticity or sales do not result in material over or under-collection of the electrical corporations.”¹¹ Now incorporated into the Public Utilities Code, section 739.10, this required the CPUC to re-implement revenue regulation. The CPUC first re-implemented revenue regulation for PG&E in 2004, when the company came out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy following the Western Energy Crisis.

**Authorized Revenue Requirement**

The CPUC determines PG&E’s authorized revenue requirement through a General Rate Case (GRC) every three years. Each of PG&E’s functional operating areas is decoupled and the Commission determines a separate authorized revenue requirement for each area.

In order to determine the appropriate revenue requirement and rates, a future test year is used, meaning that the costs included in the revenue requirement and sales levels used to determine rates are forecasted. For example, on December 21, 2009, PG&E filed its application for the 2011 GRC. This GRC used the future test year 2011 to determine PG&E’s authorized revenue requirements in 2011. The test year revenue requirement includes both projected expenses and capital expenditures.

The electric distribution revenue requirement request was based on the costs PG&E forecasted it would incur in 2011 to:

- Own, operate, and maintain:
  - Its distribution plant;

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¹⁰ CPUC Decision 93887 12/30/1981. From PG&E PPT Rissler.

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- A portion of its transmission plant providing service directly to specific customers and connecting to specific generation resources; and
- A portion of its common and general plant; as well as
- Provide services to its electric customers.

The generation revenue requirement request was based on the costs PG&E forecasted it would incur in 2011 to:
- Own, operate, and maintain its electric generating plant; and
- Perform the transactions necessary to procure electricity for its bundled-service electric customers. Because all customer classes are decoupled, the revenue requirement also includes costs related to serving all customers.

In the 2011 GRC, PG&E received a total revenue requirement of $5977 million. The retail revenue requirement for electric distribution was $3190 million, for gas distribution $1131 million, and for electric generation $1656 million.

**Rate of Return**

CPUC calculates the authorized revenue requirements for PG&E based on a rate of return on its rate base of 8.79 percent, which is projected to provide an 11.35-percent return on equity. Although intervening parties in the state's consolidated cost of capital proceedings have alleged that revenue regulation reduces financial risk, there has been no explicit reduction of the return on equity or debt-equity ratio attributable to the implementation of revenue regulation.

**Costs Not Included in Revenue Regulation**

According to PG&E, only approximately six percent of its electric revenues are "at risk," meaning not decoupled or tracked through another mechanism; only 4.2 percent of natural gas revenues are not decoupled. In addition to energy procurement costs, revenue regulation does not apply to PG&E's FERC-regulated electric transmission revenue requirement or to a portion of PG&E's gas transmission and storage revenue requirement. Costs not included in PG&E's revenue requirement include energy procurement costs.

**Revenue Adjustment Mechanism**

PG&E's revenue adjustment mechanism allows for two methods for changing the authorized revenue requirement between rate cases. The first mechanism is the stair-step method, through which adjustments to the revenue requirement are predetermined during the GRC. Second, PG&E's revenue adjustment mechanism allows for changes in the post–test-year revenue requirements, in addition to the predetermined adjustments, for "exogenous changes."

During the GRC, the CPUC also determines the authorized revenue requirements, called post–test-year attrition increases, for the two years following the test year. In the 2011 GRC, the Commission determined the authorized revenue requirement for the future test year 2011 in addition to the post–test-year attrition increases for 2012 and 2013.

The annual attrition adjustments were fixed dollar amounts of $180 million in 2012, and $185 million in 2013, except for allowed exogenous changes. In this context, attrition refers to the decrease in utility revenues compared with costs between rate cases; attrition adjustments refer to adjustments to the authorized revenue designed to allow the utility to recover the increased costs. The 2012 increase includes $123 million for electric distribution, $35 million for gas distribution, and $22 million for electric generation. The 2013 increase includes $123 million for electric distribution, $35 million for gas distribution, and $27 million for electric generation.

Next, PG&E's attrition mechanism allows adjustments to the post–test-year revenue requirements for exogenous factors, limited to five factors, which are determined during the GRC. The five factors determined through the 2011 GRC to be applied to the 2012 and 2013 attrition adjustments are: postage rate changes, franchise fee changes, income tax rate changes, payroll tax rate changes, and ad valorem tax changes. A $10 million threshold is applicable to each factor each year.

**Reconciling Actual Revenue With Authorized Revenue**

Since 2004, PG&E has utilized balancing accounts to implement revenue regulation. Balancing accounts track the difference between billed revenue and the authorized revenue requirement each month in order to determine the total annual under- or over-collection of revenue. The revenue balancing accounts (RBAs) are credited each month with billed retail revenue and debited each month with the total amount of authorized annual revenue divided by 12. Any surplus or deficit is tracked and all monthly surpluses and deficits are totaled at the end of the year. The total

annual surplus or deficit, plus interest, is amortized and refunded to or collected from ratepayers in the following year through a rate adjustment. PG&E uses different balancing accounts to track specific revenue streams separately and recover or refund over or under-collections separately. For example, PG&E may over-collect distribution revenue, leading to a surplus in that account and requiring a refund to ratepayers. In the same period, the utility could under-collect public purpose revenue, leading to a deficit in that account, which would be recovered from ratepayers. It is possible that from a ratepayer perspective, refunds from surplus accounts and recovery from deficit accounts could cancel each other out. PG&E tracks numerous revenue streams through balancing accounts, including:

- Distribution Revenue Adjustment Mechanism;
- Public program purpose Revenue Adjustment;
- Nuclear decommissioning Adjustment Mechanism;
- Utility Generation Balancing Account; and
- Regulatory Asset Revenue Adjustment Mechanism.

Generally, rate adjustments apply equally to all customers in all rate schedules, with some exceptions. For example, direct access customers are exempt from changes in generation costs. Revenue regulation rate adjustments occur annually, with rate adjustments attributable to over- or under-collection in a year being effective January 1 the following year. CPUC requires PG&E to file an Annual Electric True-Up advice letter by September 1 of each year with its preliminary forecast of electric rate changes expected, including revenue regulation and other adjustments. The account balances as of December 31 will determine the final changes to rates that become effective on January 1. In its 2012 Annual Electric True-Up advice letter, PG&E included 23 balancing accounts that were approved for that year.

Complementary Policies

California has implemented energy savings goals for its investor-owned utilities, calling for approximately one percent savings annually through 2020. The Risk/Reward Incentive Mechanism, implemented in 2007, provides an incentive if the utility meets at least 85 percent of its savings goals. Utilities can receive 9 percent of net benefits if they achieve between 85 and 99 percent of savings goals and 12 percent of net benefits if they meet or exceed savings goals up to the earnings cap of $450 million. Penalties are triggered when actual energy efficiency savings are at or below 65 percent of the individual utility savings goal. First, utilities must reimburse ratepayers dollar-for-dollar for any negative net benefits; this is considered part of the penalty payment. Utilities must also pay a per-unit penalty rate of $0.05/kWh and $25/kW. The total penalty is also capped at $450 million.

PG&E currently offers residential customers service under a default inclining block rate structure. Residential customers may volunteer for time-of-use (TOU) rates, with peak, part-peak, and off-peak tiers for summer, and part-peak and off-peak tiers for winter. Discounted rates for low-income and medically fragile customers are available, but they too are inclining. Commercial customers take service on a Peak Day Pricing default rate but can opt out to take service under a TOU structure. Peak Day Pricing is TOU pricing with a surcharge added on top during 9 to 15 peak events called during the year. Each of these rate structures signals customers that increased use of energy will be increasingly more expensive. These rate designs create a situation in which utility revenues are greatly affected by weather, whereas their investment and labor costs are not; the revenue regulation mechanism buffers utility revenues and earnings from these weather effects.

Some Commissions have implemented service quality programs to ensure that utilities don’t engage in destructive cost cutting to improve margins under revenue regulation. PG&E files annual reliability reports, but there is no explicit penalty or reward associated with performance. However, a new initiative by the CPUC is exploring how to elevate the importance of safety in gas and electric utility rate cases, which would be supported through a performance-based ratemaking platform.

Energy Efficiency Outcomes

Because PG&E has been decoupled in one form or another since 1984, it is very difficult to determine the effect of revenue regulation on the implementation of energy efficiency programs. However, PG&E has reported that incremental energy efficiency savings have consistently exceeded one percent of retail sales over the last ten years.

16 EIA. Form EIA-861 data files. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/.
Resources

California Division of Ratepayer Advocates
Report on the Cost of Capital for Test Year 2013,
  Docket A. 12-04-015 (August 6, 2012)

California Public Utilities Commission
Docket 09-12-020
  Settlement Agreement (May 13, 2011)
Docket 10-07-027
  Decision 11-05-018 (May 5, 2011)
Resolution E-3862 (April 1, 2004)

Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Advice Letters 3896-E, 3896-E-A, 3896-E-B:
  Annual Electric True-Up and Supplemental Filings
    (January 23, 2012)
Advice 3727-E: Annual Electric True-Up Filing
  (September 1, 2010)
General Rate Case Application of Pacific Gas and
Electric Company (December 21, 2009)
Idaho: Idaho Power Company

Idaho Power Company’s (IPC) Fixed Cost Adjustment (FCA) mechanism compares the authorized fixed-cost revenue requirement with weather-normalized sales and reconciles the difference annually for residential and small business customers. The allowed revenue is determined on a per-customer basis during the general rate case, and the total fixed-cost recovery amount is adjusted based on the number of customers.

**Authority**

In 2004, the Idaho Public Utilities Commission established a case to investigate financial disincentives to investment in energy efficiency by IPC. After a series of workshops, in 2007 the Commission approved a three-year pilot of IPC’s proposed revenue regulation mechanism. In 2009, the Commission extended the pilot for an additional two years, starting January 1, 2010. On April 2, 2012, the Idaho Public Utilities Commission made the IPC pilot program permanent.

**Authorized Revenue Requirement**

During the general rate case, the Commission establishes the class-specific portion of IPC’s revenue requirement. For purposes of the FCA, this includes the fixed costs collected through Residential Service and Small General Service customer rates. During the general rate case, the Commission also establishes a fixed-cost per-customer rate—the amount of fixed cost revenue the Company will recover from each customer. Finally, the Commission must also establish the fixed-cost per-kWh rate—the portion of retail rates that covers fixed costs. “Fixed costs” are defined much more broadly than accounting standards provide, including return, taxes, and labor expenses.

**Rate of Return**

IPC’s most recent rate case resulted in an overall settlement. The Stipulation specified an overall rate of return of 7.86 percent, which combines return on equity (ROE), capital structure, and cost of debt. The Commission made no explicit adjustment to the Company’s allowed rate of return based on the implementation of the FCA.

**Revenue Adjustment Mechanism**

The revenue adjustment mechanism was designed to be weather normalized. For each customer class included in the revenue regulation mechanism, the actual number of customers (CUST) is multiplied by the fixed-cost per-customer rate (FCC) to give the allowed fixed-cost recovery amount. This pro forma amount is then compared to the fixed costs recovered by the company. This actual fixed-cost recovery is determined by taking the weather-normalized sales for each class (NORM) and multiplying it by the cost-per-kWh rate (FCE) as determined in a general rate case. The difference (allowed fixed cost recovery minus actual fixed cost recovery) determines the FCA. In this way, the revenue requirement is adjusted between rate cases based on the number of customers, and is weather normalized, leaving the weather risk with the company. This difference is the FCA and is applied to each decoupled customer class. The mathematical formula is FCA = (CUST × FCC) – (NORM × FCE). The number of customers is determined by class on the same basis as the methodology used in the general rate case.

**Reconciling Actual Revenue With Authorized Revenue**

Each month, the actual fixed-cost recovered amount is determined based on the weather-normalized sales for each customer class multiplied by the fixed-cost per-kWh rate. For reporting, a monthly “shaped” fixed cost per kWh is used for calculating actual fixed-cost revenue. This adheres to Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) and better reflects end-of-year impacts within the year. The methodology used to weather-normalize actual monthly energy used in the FCA is the same as used in the general rate case. Finally, the actual fixed-cost recovered amount is subtracted from the allowed fixed-cost recovery amount and the difference is recorded as a line item in the monthly Power Cost Adjustment (PCA) report provided to the Commission. Differences are deferred with interest until the end of the
year. The actual FCA balance will differ from that recorded in the monthly reports to reflect the fact that the deferral balance is calculated on an annual, not monthly basis. FCA balance is based on annual average prorated customer count, annual weather normalized sales, and non-shaped FCE rates, which would affect both the balance accrual and the associated interest.

Each year, the Company totals the FCA results, including interest, for the period from January 1 to December 31. If the total is negative, it represents an under-collection of revenue from customers and the amount will be recovered from ratepayers in the following year through an adder to rates (Schedule 54.) Likewise, if the total is positive, the Company has over-collected its fixed-cost revenue, and will return the excess amount to customers through an adder in rates using a credit or surcharge mechanism. These adjustments are currently included in the Annual Adjustment Mechanism line item on customer bills. Since July 2012, the Annual Adjustment Mechanism includes PCA and FCA to avoid customer confusion.

Originally, FCAs were calculated for each decoupled customer class; however, the FCA is now recovered proportionally between the residential and small general service customers for such reason as a lack of cost of service studies to support the underlying cost allocations and acknowledgment of the “portfolio” approach toward energy efficiency. Annual adjustments are capped at three percent and differences beyond that are rolled over until the next period. Adjustments to the rate occur June 1 of the year following the previous one-year period from January 1 to December 31.

IPC was initially obligated to submit its adjustment request, subject to Staff audit, on March 15 of each year. Under the pilot program, this included a detailed summary of demand-side management (DSM) activities that demonstrate an enhanced commitment to DSM resulting from implementation of the FCA. “Evidence of enhanced commitment will include, but not be limited to broad availability of efficiency and load management programs, building code improvement activity, pursuit of appliance code standards, expansion of DSM programs, pursuit of energy savings programs beyond peak shaving/load shifting programs, and third party verification” (IPC-E-04-15 Settlement Stipulation, p 5). However, the Company is no longer required to file the separate annual report specifying ways in which it increased its investment in energy efficiency and DSM as a result of the FCA mechanism. DSM is comprehensively reported in annual DSM reports filed with the Commission.

Potential Changes
The Commission noted when approving the permanent FCA that it “does not isolate or identify changes in cost recovery associated solely with the Company’s energy efficiency programs.” The Company was required to file a proposal to adjust the FCA to address the capture of changes in load not related to energy efficiency programs. In its compliance filing, IPC recommended making no change to the FCA mechanism, but did propose an altered mechanism in order to comply with the Commission’s request. The proposal would cap the annual change in per-customer consumption to two percent (up or down). The Commission had previously proposed that the FCA balance be equally shared between the customers and the Company in order to account for variations in energy consumption other than weather and energy efficiency. However, the Commission found that neither proposal satisfied its needs, stating that the Company’s proposal to cap deviations in annual usage would not have had any effect on previous FCA results. Additionally, both IPC and the Idaho Conservation League filed comments stating that the Staff’s 50/50 sharing proposal failed to remove the financial disincentives inherent in DSM programs. The Commission finally determined to keep the FCA mechanism unchanged and continue to monitor the results.

Complementary Policies
Idaho requires its investor-owned utilities to pursue all cost-effective energy efficiency; however, it does not have incentives for achieving energy efficiency savings.

IPC uses inclining block rates as the default rate structure for its residential customers, but there is also available an optional Time-of-Day pilot program with summer and winter peak and off-peak periods. Small general service customers take service on a two-tier, inclining block schedule.

IPC has no filing or reporting requirements relating to service quality (except in Oregon).

Energy Efficiency Outcomes
Before IPC implemented revenue regulation in January 2007, it reported increasing incremental energy efficiency savings from 0 percent of retail load in 2003 to 0.5 percent of

Decoupling Case Studies: Revenue Regulation Implementation in Six States

retail load in 2006. Since the revenue regulation mechanism was implemented, reported savings have increased from 0.6 percent in 2007 to 1.3 percent in 2010 (with low or no reported savings in 2009 and 2011.)¹⁸ The DSM Report for 2012 shows this to be 1.2 percent.

Resources
Idaho Public Utilities Commission
IPC-E-09-28 - Idaho Power — Application to Make the Fixed Cost Adjustment Permanent
IPC-E-11-19 - Idaho Power — Request to Convert Schedule 54 (Fca) From Pilot to Permanent

¹⁸ EIA. Form EIA-861 data files. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/
Decoupling Case Studies: Revenue Regulation Implementation in Six States

Maryland: Baltimore Gas and Electric

Baltimore Gas and Electric’s (BGE) revenue regulation mechanism compares actual distribution revenue to the authorized revenue, adjusted for the number of customers, for each applicable rate schedule. The authorized revenue, including the cost of power, is based on test year requirements and sales levels. Over- or under-collections are reconciled monthly through a rider. This mechanism differs from the others we describe by having a monthly, rather than annual, deferral and recovery period.

Authority

BGE requested a revenue regulation mechanism in 2007 due to the expected impact on electricity sales of the company’s conservation and demand response programs. BGE stated that the revenue regulation mechanism was necessary to eliminate the inherent disincentive in the traditional ratemaking process with respect to conservation and demand response. Under traditional ratemaking, BGE pointed out that, “a one percent reduction in electricity use and demand on the Company’s system for the residential and small commercial classes would cut cost recovery by approximately $4 million. This first year impact on recovery is then followed by $8 million in the second year (as an equal amount of savings is added), and so on: the five-year loss to shareholders from this steady-state utility investment program would be more than $20 million.” The revenue regulation mechanism proposed by BGE was based on its gas revenue regulation mechanism, which has been in place since 1998.

Authorized Revenue Requirement

BGE initially calculated its revenue requirement per class separately for each rate scale based on weather-normalized 2007 sales and the number of customers. Because BGE proposed the mechanism in 2007, the test year 2007 included nine months of actual sales and three months of forecasted sales. BGE used three steps to calculate the base monthly revenue requirement:

1. Calculate the Customer Charge revenues by multiplying the number of customers by the Customer Charge for each class.
2. Calculate the Delivery Service revenues by multiplying the weather-normalized sales by the Delivery Price for each class.
3. Add the Customer Charge revenues and the Delivery Service revenues to determine the base revenue requirements for each class.

BGE’s residential, small general service and general service customers are included in the revenue regulation mechanism.

Rate of Return

BGE was allowed a return on common equity of 9.75 percent applied to a common equity ratio of 51.05 percent in its most recent rate case. BGE strongly opposed the reduction of its ROE and preferred another lost revenue mechanism over revenue regulation if an ROE reduction was implemented as a result of revenue regulation.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) made no adjustment to BGE’s ROE when revenue regulation was first implemented in 2007, but did reduce its allowed ROE by 50 basis points in the last rate case. The Commission had previously reduced the ROE of another utility by 50 basis points when it adopted a similar revenue regulation mechanism for that utility.

Revenue Adjustment Mechanism

On a monthly basis, the adjustment to base revenue requirement is calculated for each rate class using the following steps:

19 BGE. (2007, October 26). 9111FilingConservativa102607F. Available at: http://webapp.psc.state.md.us/intranet/maillog/content.cfm?filepath=C:\5CCasenum%5CAdmin%20Filings%5C60000-109999%5C108061%5C9111FilingConservativa102607F.pdf.
20 Potomac Electric Power Company.
21 BGE’s gas mechanism was approved in a 1998 settlement that did not discuss any adjustment to ROE.
1. Calculate the revenue adjustment for the change in the number of customers by multiplying the change in the number of customers by the Customer Charge.

2. Calculate the revenue adjustment associated with the change in sales by multiplying the change in the number of customers by the average use per customer and multiplying that product by the Delivery Price for the class.

3. Calculate the target base revenues for each class for the current period by adding the two types of adjustments to the revenue requirement.

The Delivery Price for each class is the delivery rate, established by the PSC, adjusted for the electric universal service charge, nuclear decommissioning credits, and the administrative credit associated with the administrative adder portion of the Standard Offer Service rates.\(^{22}\)

BGE had a full electric and gas rate case in 2010\(^ {23}\) and another one filed in 2013 and concluded in 2014.\(^ {24}\) Both reset the required decoupling elements—monthly revenue requirement, monthly average usage per customer, and number of customers. Neither case changed the mechanism.

The decoupling mechanism now excludes lost sales resulting from major storms.

### Reconciling Actual Revenue With Authorized Revenue

On a monthly basis, each rate class’s target base revenues are compared to the actual base revenues for the month. The difference is divided by the forecasted sales for the following period to calculate the monthly rate adjustment. Balancing accounts are used to record the timing differences associated with when the adjustments are calculated versus when they are billed or refunded. The monthly rate adjustment, Rider 25, is capped at ten percent of rates. Any amount beyond ten percent of the current rate will be carried over and reconciled in the subsequent period.

### Complementary Policies

Maryland requires its electric utilities to provide energy efficiency services to achieve a ten-percent reduction in per capita electricity use by 2015. The state’s overall goal is a 15 percent reduction of per capita electricity use by 2015. Although the PSC is explicitly allowed to approve financial incentive mechanisms to promote energy efficiency, no incentives have been approved yet.\(^ {25}\)

BGE’s default service to its standard offer residential customers (those customers who have not elected to take generation service from an alternate supplier) features seasonal rates—summer and winter. BGE also offers a TOU rate as an option to standard offer residential customers and as the default rate for small general service customers.

Regarding performance incentives under revenue regulation, in October 2012, Maryland issued a four-part plan designed to speed up investments that will strengthen the state’s distribution grid. Part of that plan would set a rate-making structure that aligns customer and utility incentives by rewarding reliability that exceeds established reliability metrics and penalizing failure to reach those metrics. A task force has encouraged the Maryland state regulatory commission to implement a performance-based ratemaking process for IOUs such as BGE, linking a utility’s progress or failure to meet certain reliability metrics with its authorized rate of return.

### Energy Efficiency Outcomes

When BGE implemented electric revenue regulation in mid 2007, it had not achieved incremental energy savings for several years. In 2008 it reported incremental savings of 0.5 percent of retail load, increasing to 1.7 percent in 2010 and 2011.

### Resources

**Maryland Public Service Commission**

Letter Order ML 108061 (December 27, 2007)

Letter Orders ML 108069 (November 30, 2007)

Case No. 9036

Order No. 80460 (December 21, 2005)

Case No. 9230

Order No. 83907 (December 13, 2013)

Case No. 9326

Order No. 86060 (December 13, 2013)

\(^{22}\) BGE. (2007, October 26). 9111FilingConserva102607F. Available at: http://webapp.psc.state.md.us/intranet/maillog/content.cfm?filepath=C:\5CCasenum\5CAdmin\20Filings\5C60000-109999\5C108061\5C9111FilingConserva102607F.pdf

\(^{23}\) Case No. 9230 – See references above.

\(^{24}\) Case No. 9326 – See references above.


\(^{26}\) EIA. Form EIA-861 data files. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/
Decoupling Case Studies: Revenue Regulation Implementation in Six States

Wisconsin: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation's (WPS) Revenue Stabilization Mechanism (RSM) began in 2009 as a four-year revenue regulation pilot that reconciled target marginal revenue per customer with actual marginal revenue per customer. As of 2012, the pilot was extended, albeit with some modifications. This section focuses on the current iteration of the RSM.

Authority

The Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (PSCW) approved a revenue regulation pilot for WPS in a December 2008 rate case order (Docket No. 6690-UR-119). The revenue regulation mechanism was effective from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2012 and applied to the utility’s electric and gas operations. In a rate case completed in December 2012 (Docket No. 6690-UR-121), the pilot was extended, and a modified RSM was approved. The extended RSM is in effect from January 2013 until the next rate case.

Authorized Revenue Requirement

The authorized revenue requirement is determined through a rate case. The Commission uses a future test year to determine the revenue requirement. The cost of fuel is not included in the revenue requirement but is addressed through a “Retail Electric Fuel Rule” adjustment.

Rate of Return

The Commission authorized a rate of return on utility common equity of 10.30 percent in Docket No. 6690-UR-120. This rate remained the same in Docket No. 6690-UR-121 and is currently in effect.

Revenue Adjustment Mechanism

WPS implemented a new electric RSM based on a “Total Rate Case Margin” mechanism instead of a “Total Rate Case Margin per Customer” mechanism, which had been the practice during the initial four-year pilot phase. The revision was intended to remove the calculation sensitivities related to sales per customer from the original RSM calculation. The margin reflected in the formula equals the total revenue for each tariff, less the costs associated with the annual per-kWh value established for monitored fuel costs, and excluding any surcharges, credits, taxes, or similar charges. The “Total Rate Case Margin” mechanism allows WPS to achieve the total margin assumed in the forecasted test year, no more, and no less. The new RSM will be in effect on a pilot basis until the effective date of WPS’s next general rate order, which WPS committed to filing for the 2014 and/or 2015 test years. The RSM applies to most tariffs, except large commercial and industrial customers.

Reconciling Actual Revenue With Authorized Revenue

Each year, the utility compares the total target revenue and the total actual revenue and defers the difference, subject to carrying costs based on WPS’s last approved short-term debt rate. The margin will be based on annual per-kWh value established for monitored fuel costs, which is done in a rate case. The margin is determined by subtracting the average kWh value from the authorized energy rates.

The formula for calculating an electric under-recovery or over-recovery is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{[actual margin minus ratecase forecasted margin established in the most recent rate proceeding]}$$

The summation is over each tariff. A positive value equals an over-recovery, and a negative value equals an over-recovery.

27 The pilot extension is in effect until the effective date of a Final Decision issued by the Commission on an application for a general base rate case filed after January 1, 2013.

under-recovery. The margin reflected in the formula equals the total revenue for each tariff, less the costs associated with the annual per-kWh value established for monitored fuel costs, and excluding any surcharges, credits, taxes, or similar charges.

In the event that a true-up will cause rates to increase, the Commission will provide an opportunity for a hearing. Revenue regulation adjustments occur as a part of the general rate case.

The revenue regulation adjustments are subject to a $14 million per year cap for electric, excluding carrying costs. Any adjustments over that amount will not be carried over and will not be collected from ratepayers. Equivalently, revenue over collection in excess of $14 million will not be returned to ratepayers.

**Complementary Policies**

WPS, like all other investor-owned utilities in Wisconsin, is required to spend 1.2 percent of its annual operating revenues on energy efficiency and customer-owned renewable resource programs that are administered by a third party through the Focus on Energy program, which was established in 2002. In addition, through a contract, the PSCW approves annual electricity savings goals for the Focus on Energy program. The savings goals were equivalent to 0.75 percent of electric sales for the participating utilities from 2011 to 2013. In addition, the PSCW approved a rate of return on investments in energy efficiency for Wisconsin Power & Light, and other utilities can propose incentives as part of their rate cases. However, WPS has not yet proposed an incentive mechanism.

WPS offers residential customers a default flat rate, but they also offer a TOU option with winter and summer on-peak, off-peak, and shoulder tiers. For small commercial and industrial customers, there are flat rates, TOU rates, and critical peak rates. Large commercial and industrial customers can take service under a TOU rate with summer and winter on-peak and off-peak rates, a TOU with critical peak rate, or under a special contract rate unique to the customer and approved by the Commission.

The authorized level of expensed conservation costs recoverable in rates for the test year (2013) is $19,778,728. The level for electric utility operations consists of the conservation budget of $17,669,792, and an escrow adjustment of $2,108,936, which represents the test year amortization of the projected overspent escrow balance at December 31, 2012, over two years.

Wisconsin has a statute requiring filing of reliability data, but no reward or penalty system to support its revenue regulation system.

**Energy Efficiency Outcomes**

WPS implemented revenue regulation in 2009. In order to gain approval for the original revenue regulation mechanism, WPS agreed to fund energy efficiency and renewable energy programs at levels above their 1.2-percent statutory minimum contribution to Focus on Energy. Focus on Energy produces an annual report of energy efficiency program activities. In its 2012 report, Focus on Energy reports the following outcomes achieved for WPS’ service territory. The table below represents the savings under the statewide Focus on Energy Programs and does not represent the savings attributed under the funding levels above 1.2 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Utility Type</th>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Per Capita Lifecycle Bill Savings ($)</th>
<th>Customer Participation Rate (%)</th>
<th>Per Capita Incentive ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Electric</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>$115,258</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>$83.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Electric</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>$9,026,768</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>$8,924.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Electric</td>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>$6,494</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>$6.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resources**

**Public Service Commission of Wisconsin**

Application of Wisconsin Public Service Corporation for Authority to Adjust Electric and Natural Gas Rates, Final Decision. (December 7, 2012). Docket No. 6690-UR-121.


**Focus on Energy**


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29 The required spending level was higher for the year 2011 owing to a temporary change in state policy.

30 ACEEE. Wisconsin. Available at: http://aceee.org/sector/state-policy/wisconsin

31 The Cadmus Group, Inc. (2013).
The revenue regulation mechanism for National Grid (Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company together doing business as National Grid) compares authorized distribution revenue to actual distribution revenue. Revenue is compared and adjustments are made separately for each customer class.

**Authority**

The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) adopted revenue regulation as a statewide regulatory policy in 2008 and individual utilities filed revenue regulation tariffs in response. In its *Investigation Into Rate Structures that will Promote Efficient Deployment of Demand Resources*, the DPU investigated rate structures and revenue recovery mechanisms that may reduce disincentives to the efficient deployment of demand resources in the state and considered how the electric and natural gas distribution companies’ existing cost recovery mechanism could be changed to better align the companies’ financial incentives with policy objectives while ensuring that the companies are not financially harmed by the increased use of demand resources. The DPU finally concluded that revenue regulation mechanisms would eliminate the financial disincentives because they sever the link between the companies’ revenue and reduction in sales. The DPU also endorsed a revenue per customer approach, but recognized that other factors could result in changes to distribution-related costs and consented to consider company-specific ratemaking proposals that accounted for the impact of capital spending and inflationary pressures on the company’s required revenue.

**Authorized Revenue Requirement**

The authorized revenue requirement does not include costs that are reconciled outside of base distribution rates, including energy supply costs for basic service customers, transmission costs, the energy efficiency system benefits charge and reconciling charge, and costs recovered through the residential assistance adjustment factor.

**Rate of Return**

The Commission recognized the effects of revenue regulation on ROE, and determined that revenue regulation reduces volatility, which reduces risk, and a downward adjustment to ROE was appropriate, but did not make its actual ROE adjustment for the revenue regulation mechanism explicit in its order. The DPU determined that a return on equity equal to 10.35 percent was sufficient. The testimony from National Grid supporting its proposed ROE presented comparisons of allowed ROE for a set of companies that had revenue regulation or another risk management mechanism in place to account for an implied reduced risk profile in developing that proposal.

**Revenue Adjustment Mechanism**

Each year the authorized revenue requirement is adjusted to account for capital expenditures in the previous year. The CapEx Adjustment applies to capital expenditures incurred by National Grid for distribution system investments in the previous year, net of the amount recovered through depreciation expense in base rates. This accounts for the material difference in expected capital expenditures compared with prior years. In this way, the CapEx Adjustment in the National Grid revenue regulation mechanism is a special case of a "K Factor," which characterizes an expected change in costs in the future and accounts for those changes when they occur. Each year, the Company files with the Department documentation in support of the capital expenditures it has incurred since the previous review. The Department reviews the filings to determine the prudence of the incremental expenditures and whether the expenditures are used and useful. National Grid then allocates approved expenditures to rate classes based on the cost of service study. For each class, the Company determines the adjustment allocated to the rate class then divides this sum by the forecasted kWh sales for the follow-

ing year to determine the per-kWh adjustment.

In order to provide a balance between providing the Company with sufficient funds to ensure the safety and reliability of the distribution system and protecting ratepayers against the incentive the Company has to overinvest in infrastructure, the mechanism limits the level of annual capital expenditures that is recoverable through the mechanism. To arrive at the amount, the Department set a limit of $170 million per year, which is equal to the approximate three-year average of the Company’s capital spending in previous years. Should the Company’s capital expenditures exceed this limit, it may seek to include the investment in the rate base during the next base rate proceeding.

The Company submits its CapEx filing no later than July 1 of each year. On November 1 of each year, the Company submits all other information in support of its proposed adjustment factors. The factors will take effect on March 1 of each year.

The authorized revenue is also adjusted to include a 50-percent sharing for earnings above the authorized ROE.

Reconciling Actual Revenue With Authorized Revenue

Each year, National Grid calculates on a rate class-specific basis, the difference between the actual distribution revenue billed to customers through distribution rates and the annual target revenue. For each rate class, the difference between the actual billed distribution revenue and the annual target revenue is summed to determine the Company-wide reconciliation amount. That amount is divided by the Company-wide kWh forecasted for the upcoming year to arrive at a cent-per-kWh reconciliation charge or credit.

To determine the final adjustment for each rate class, the Company-wide reconciliation adjustment is added to the rate class-specific adjustment resulting from the target revenue adjustment mechanisms.

The adjustment to the authorized revenue in any year is capped at three percent of total revenues. Any excess can be carried forward to a future year with carrying charges equal to the customer deposit rate.

National Grid must report to the DPU if the difference between the year-to-date billed revenue and year-to-date annual target revenue equals or exceeds ten percent of the target revenue and the Company believes that the difference will fall outside of the ten-percent threshold in the coming months. In this case, interim revenue regulation adjustments can be made. In order to avoid an interim adjustment too close to the scheduled annual rate adjustment, National Grid must notify the Department of variances exceeding ten percent of annual target revenue by August 31 of each year.

Complementary Policies

Massachusetts requires that electric utilities procure all cost-effective energy efficiency before more expensive supply-side resources. This requirement was translated into annual savings requirements for electric utilities starting from 1 percent of sales in 2009, to 1.4 percent in 2010, 2 percent in 2011, and 2.4 percent in 2012, and potentially increased savings in subsequent years. Utilities can earn approximately five percent of program costs for meeting or exceeding savings targets.

National Grid offers inclining block rates as the default residential rate, but there is an optional TOU rate with peak and off-peak tiers also available to residential customers. Small and large industrial and commercial customers can take service under flat rates, inclining block rates, or TOU rates.

National Grid operates under a penalty and reward system for service quality, established in Docket D.T.E. 99-84. The impetus behind the DPU’s original establishment of the Service Quality Guidelines was to prevent Massachusetts utilities from allowing service quality to deteriorate under a new regulatory regime.

Energy Efficiency Outcomes

Before Massachusetts Electric implemented revenue regulation in 2009, it reported consistently high levels of incremental energy efficiency savings, approximately 0.9 percent of retail load. In 2010, the company reported 1.36 percent savings and 1.59 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively.

Resources
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
Docket 09-39
Petition of Massachusetts Electric Company
(November 30, 2009)

35 ACEEE, Massachusetts. Available at: http://aceee.org/sector/state-policy/massachusetts
36 Personal communication with National Grid.
Hawaii: Hawaiian Electric Company

Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO) uses a revenue regulation mechanism that compares actual revenue to target revenue in each year. The target revenue is based on the authorized revenue for the last test year adjusted for operation and maintenance (O&M) increases and rate base changes.

HECO is a subsidiary of Hawaiian Electric Industries, which also operates Maui Electric Company (MECO) and Hawaiian Electric Light Company; these subsidiaries service the islands of Maui and Hawaii County, while HECO serves Oahu (Honolulu).

Authority

In 2008, the Governor of Hawaii, the Division of Consumer Advocacy, and HECO entered into an agreement as a result of the Hawaii Clean Energy Initiative. The agreement is intended to move Hawaii away from its dependence on imported fossil fuels for electricity and ground transportation, and toward locally produced renewable energy and energy efficiency. In the agreement, the State, the Consumer Advocate, and HECO committed to, among other things, a transition away from a model that encourages increased electricity usage and to a model that implements revenue regulation decoupling to encourage the development of renewable energy by HECO. The Commission opened Docket 2008-0274 in order to examine the features of a revenue regulation mechanism. The Opening Order directed HECO and the Consumer Advocate to file a joint proposal on revenue regulation within 60 days. This joint proposal was modeled closely after the California mechanism described earlier for PG&E, with a rate-case determined revenue requirement, plus annual attrition adjustments, plus separate mechanisms to recover power supply and energy efficiency costs.

The Hawaii Public Utilities Commission approved revenue regulation for HECO in August 2010 based on an investigation into the appropriateness of revenue regulation and its design. The revenue regulation mechanism took effect on March 1, 2011. This replaced a previous lost revenue adjustment mechanism.

Authorized Revenue Requirement

The Commission establishes the Authorized Base Revenus through a general rate case based on traditional cost-of-service ratemaking principles. The Authorized Base Revenue is the annual amount of revenues required for the utility to recover its estimated O&M, depreciation, amortization, and tax expenses for the period.

The Target Revenue is equal to the base revenue requirement less any revenue being separately tracked or recovered through any other surcharge or tracking mechanism, including revenue for fuel and purchased power expenses.

The revenue regulation order also requires staggered triennial rate cases for each of the Hawaiian Electric Industries Companies to determine approved baseline Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (RAM) inputs.

Rate of Return

The Commission made no explicit adjustment to ROE owing to the revenue regulation mechanism, but noted that the allowed ROE of ten percent reflects the approval of revenue regulation and other cost-recovery mechanisms that will lower HECO's business risk. Most recently, the Hawaiian Public Utilities Commission approved a 9.0-percent ROE for MECO, reflecting both a lower baseline cost.
of capital and a penalty of 0.50 percent associated with inadequate performance bringing renewable energy into the MECO system. A companion Order also established new guidance on future revenue regulation mechanisms.

**Revenue Adjustment Mechanism**

The RAM is designed to replace the need for annual rate cases by adjusting Authorized Base Revenue levels to reflect estimated changes in the utility’s cost of service. The RAM is intended to, via formula-driven estimates and escalators, compensate the HECO Companies for changes in utility costs and infrastructure investment between rate cases and reduce the frequency of rate cases. The RAM Period is the calendar year containing the Annual Evaluation Date (March 31, the date of the annual RAM filing). The RAM adjusts the revenue requirement according to changes in four main categories of expenses:

- **Base expenses**, which are changes in designated O&M expenses;
- **Rate base**, the return on incremental investment in designated rate base components;
- **The incremental depreciation and amortization expenses**; and
- **Exogenous tax changes**, changes in costs owing to significant changes in tax laws or tax regulations

Base expenses are segregated between labor and non-labor amounts. The labor component is adjusted annually by the Labor Cost Escalation Rate, reduced by the Labor Productivity Offset (fixed at 0.76 percent). The non-labor component uses the Non-labor Escalation Rate to annually adjust those costs. Tracked O&M expenses for fuel, purchased power, pension and post-employment benefits, integrated resource planning, DSM, and other rate adjustment provisions are not adjusted in the RAM, because any changes in these costs are accounted for in other cost-tracking mechanisms.

The Rate Base equals the average net investment estimated for the RAM Period. The average rate base is the rate base for the rate case test year, with adjustments for changes in only four components of rate base: (1) average plant-in-service, (2) average Accumulated Depreciation, (3) average accumulated contributions in aid of construction, and (4) average accumulated deferred income taxes. All other components of the rate base remain the same as in the preceding rate case test year. The average plant-in-service is equal to the average of the actual plant-in-service at the end of the year prior to the RAM period, the Evaluation Year, and the same year-end balance plus estimated plant additions for the RAM period. Plant additions include Baseline Capital Project plant additions and Major Capital Projects plant additions estimated to be in service by September 30 of the RAM period.

The RAM also includes an Earnings Sharing Revenue Credit mechanism in order to protect against excessive overall utility revenue levels. The RAM will escalate and update the Company’s approved base revenue requirement, reduced by earnings sharing credits and major project revenue credits to customers. Based on the Company’s achieved return on common equity for the Evaluation Year, the mechanism credits the RBAs according to the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROE at or below the authorized ROE</th>
<th>Retained entirely by shareholders, no customer credits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First 100 basis points (1%) over authorized ROE</td>
<td>25% share credit to customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 200 basis points (2%) over authorized ROE</td>
<td>50% share credit to customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE exceeding 300 basis points (3%) over authorized ROE</td>
<td>90% share credit to customers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the RAM includes additional consumer protections:

- A provision for Major Capital Projects Credits;
- A provision for Baseline Capital Projects Credits;
- Notification is provided to all affected customers of the RAM filing in newspapers and bills;
- Evaluation procedures for filing, examination, and any exceptions to annual revenue regulation filings;
- Continued ability of HECO or the Consumer Advocate to request formal rate proceedings to replace and terminate RAM at any time; and
- Formal review of revenue regulation as a part of the next round of rate case proceedings;

A recent order added two additional consumer protections:

- A limitation that only 90 percent of the current

40 Hawaii PUC, Decision and Order No. 31289. (2013, May 31).
41 Hawaii PUC, Decision and Order No. 31908. (2014, Feb. 1).
RAM Period Rate Base that exceeds the Rate Base Adjustment Mechanism from the prior year can be included in the Decoupling Mechanism for baseline utility plant projects, which, unlike major capital projects, are not subject to prior Commission review and approval; and,

- A requirement to post a number of metrics online for customer review, although not at this point tied to performance.

This order also examined four issues with respect to the application of the RAM. The Commission determined that the short-term debt rate, as reflected in the most recent rate case, should be used to adjust over- and under-collections. The Commission also resolved its concern that, without a sustainable business plan, there exists no strategic framework under which to evaluate capital expenditure programs. The Commission required the parties in the Docket to further explore capital expenditure issues in conjunction with other risk-sharing mechanisms discussed elsewhere in the order. The commission ordered a further evaluation of a proposed risk-sharing mechanism within the RBA. Furthermore, the Commission ordered the parties to work together to establish appropriate metrics, which the utility would report on its website.

Once the total RAM Revenue Adjustment is calculated, it is applied through a uniform adjustment to the per-kWh energy charge for all customer classes.

**Reconciling Actual Revenue with Authorized Revenue**

RBAs record the monthly differences between target revenues and the adjusted recorded electric sales revenues. The RBA also applies monthly interest, equal to the annual rate for short-term debt from the cost of capital in each HECO Company’s last base rate case, to the simple average of the beginning and ending balances each month in the RBA. In effect, the RBA applies one-twelfth of the rate each month. Finally, the RBA provides for collection or return of the calendar year-end balances in the RBA and recovery of the RAM Revenue Adjustment over the subsequent May 1 through April 30 period. The target revenue is the most recent Authorized Base Revenue or the re-determined Authorized Base Revenue calculated under the RAM.

On or before March 28, the Company must file with the Commission a statement of the previous year-end balance in each RBA sub-account and the RAM Revenue Adjustment are recovered through the per-kWh RBA rate adjustments. The rate adjustment occurs from May 1 of the current calendar year to April 30 of the next year.

**Complementary Policies**

Currently, electric utilities in Hawaii may use energy efficiency to meet a portion of their Renewable Portfolio Standard requirements. Starting in 2015, electricity savings from energy efficiency will be applied to the State’s Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard, which sets a target equivalent to 30-percent forecast sales by 2030. This goal is translated into a target of 1.4 percent annual savings. HECO transferred administration of all of its energy efficiency programs to a third party administrator in 2009. The administrator is compensated for satisfactory performance.43

Because of its heavy dependence on petroleum as a generation fuel, electricity prices in Hawaii are very high; solar and wind are typically lower-cost resources for these systems. HECO’s default residential rates are inclining block rates with a $9.00/month customer charge, and a three-block inclining rate design of $0.34/kWh to $0.37/kWh. Residential customers can elect to take service under a TOU rate with off-peak, mid-peak, and priority-peak tiers. General service and large power service customers take service under a flat rate, unless they opt to take service under a TOU.

Hawaii is developing reliability standards, in part as a response to deteriorating service quality as a result of distributed and customer-owned generation (see text box). In an effort to make electricity reliability and interconnection standards as transparent as possible, the Reliability Standards Working Group was formed in the Feed-In Tariff docket and continues its work in Docket No. 2011-0206 to find solutions to integrating high penetrations of renewable energy consistent with reliability and power quality standards.

**Energy Efficiency Outcomes**

HECO implemented revenue regulation in 2011. Since 2003, HECO has reported incremental energy efficiency savings between 0 and 0.5 percent of retail load, with 1.31 percent savings reported in 2011 by Hawaii Energy, the

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43 ACEEE. Hawaii. Available at: http://aceee.org/sector/state-policy/hawaii
Revenue regulation represents a regulatory framework that removes the financial disincentive for utilities to pursue clean energy strategies. It doesn’t, in and of itself, align the utility business model with those utility policies and practices that address customer expectations. In fact, some commissions are concerned that it might create a dynamic in which the utility, assured of its revenue needs, becomes complacent and lacks motivation to innovate and develop strategies that may be more in line with the public interest.

In a recent order (Docket 2011-0092, May 31, 2013) the Hawaiian Public Utilities Commission addressed this big picture issue in a rate order for Maui Electric. The Commission called out the management as lacking a long-term vision for creating customer value and expressed concern that “the HECO Companies’ over-reliance upon a link between the [Decoupling] Agreement and utility financial health obfuscates utility performance and ultimately customer service and satisfaction.”

The implementation of clean energy policies is not a singular goal, but rather a policy that must be part of a larger effort to create customer value. The Commission laid out a hard path and a soft path to achieve the results they desire for consumers. The hard path involves a closer examination of utility investments, operations, and expenditures. The soft path is opened through the actions of management to create and execute a vision for the utility of the future. The Commission remains committed to regulatory innovations that are in the public interest and will work with the utility, consumer advocate, and other stakeholders to create and implement this vision.

The results of this effort will likely produce ideas and outcomes that will have applicability beyond this one utility.

State’s ratepayer funded efficiency program administrator. The company has not yet reported its savings for 2012. In addition, HECO has seen more than a sixfold increase in renewable installations under its net metering and feed-in tariff policies since the inception of the revenue regulation plan.

Resources

Hawaii Public Utilities Commission
Docket No. 2008-0274
Final Decision and Order (August 31, 2010)
Docket No. 2008-0083
Final Decision and Order (December 29, 2010)
Docket No. 2011-0092
Final Decision and Order May 31, 2013, including Decision and Orders Nos. 31288 and 31289
Docket No. 2013-0141
Final Decision and Order (February 1, 2014), including Decision and Order No. 31908.

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45 EIA. Form EIA-861 data files. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eta861/
Discussion of the Six Utilities Overall

Authority

The first step in implementing a revenue regulation mechanism is to understand the authority of the regulating body: the Public Utility Commission or PSC. It is important for any Commission to clarify its justification for acting on revenue regulation in order to prevent any decisions from being overturned. Over the years, Utilities Commissions have relied on different justifications for implementing revenue regulation mechanisms. Commissions have implemented revenue regulation at their own discretion, justified by their directive to ensure safe, reliable, and economic public utility service to citizens to justify changing the regulatory environment. In some cases, the Commission is unable to engage on narrow issue ratemaking and rates can change only as the result of a full rate case. In this case, statutes must be amended to enable revenue regulation.

In all of the case studies discussed here, the Commissions first implemented revenue regulation at their own discretion, but each followed slightly different paths to do so. The CPUC first implemented revenue regulation in 1978 at its discretion. In 2001, after a period when mechanisms were suspended, the California Legislature required that deviations from projected sales not result in under- or over-collections by utilities, and so the CPUC re-implemented revenue regulation according to statutory requirement. The Hawaii Public Utilities Commission implemented revenue regulation after an agreement between the utility, the Governor, and other stakeholders called for it. In Idaho, the Commission established a case in which to investigate revenue regulation and held a series of stakeholder workshops before implementing the policy. The Massachusetts DPU adopted revenue regulation as a statewide regulatory policy and required individual utilities to file tariffs in response as the result of its general investigation into rate structures that promote demand-side resources. The Maryland Commission implemented revenue regulation for BGE when the utility requested the mechanism. Thus the impetus to develop a revenue regulation mechanism may come from different sources and the Commission may be comfortable in moving forward under their general supervisory statutes. Nevertheless, specific statutory language can be helpful to shore up the existing authority.

Authorized Revenue Requirement

Under the traditional regulatory framework, the Commission (or other authority in the case of publicly owned utilities) must determine a utility’s revenue requirement. This function does not change under revenue regulation. The revenue requirement of a utility is the aggregate of all the operating and other costs incurred to provide service to the public. This typically includes operating expenses, depreciation, and the cost of capital invested, including interest on debt and a “fair” return on equity to investors. The (simplistic) formula for determining revenue requirements is as follows:

\[
\text{Revenue Requirements} = (\text{Rate Base} \times \text{Rate of Return}) + \text{Operating Expenses} + \text{Depreciation} + \text{Taxes}
\]

Traditionally, the revenue requirement, along with sales, is used to determine the rates consumers will pay for electricity. The rates are also broken down by customer class, and intraclass tariffs are created based usually on a cost of service study that determines each customer class and subclass contribution to the utility’s costs. The (simplistic) formula for determining the rate per unit is:

\[
\text{Rate} = \frac{\text{Revenue Requirement}}{\text{Units Sold}}
\]

In this way, rates are set to allow the utility to exactly recover its revenue requirement when the sales level used to calculate rates is equal to actual sales. However, it is important to recognize that actual expense and revenue varies with actual sales. When actual sales are greater than the sales level used in ratemaking, revenue increases and expenses increase by a different amount; when actual sales are lower than the ratemaking sales level, actual revenue

46 Lazar et al., 2011.
declines and expenses decrease by a different amount. Under revenue regulation, rates are initially set in the same way, but when actual sales differ from the level used to calculate rates, the actual revenue level is maintained at the rate case amount as rates are allowed to vary inversely with sales—increased sales lead to decreased rates and vice versa. Because the primary expenses that change in the short run as sales levels change are power supply expenses, and most regulators allow these to be tracked using a power cost adjustment mechanism, revenue regulation mechanisms are generally designed to ensure recovery of the non-power costs (which do not change significantly in the short-run) as sales volumes change.

Revenue regulation ensures that actual revenue is equal to the revenue requirement established by the Commission or appropriate authority. Although the description above presents an overly simplified view of the revenue requirement and its use in traditional price regulation and revenue regulation, there are many variations on how a Commission can establish a revenue requirement, particularly when implementing revenue regulation. With revenue regulation, as in traditional ratemaking, imprudent costs can always be removed from rates, and there is no change to the ability of a Commission to impose penalties.

Utility Functions to be Included

First, the regulator must determine which utility functions will be included in the revenue regulation framework. With vertically integrated utilities, this usually includes a utility’s regulated generation, transmission, and distribution units. As we discuss below, however, it is critical to structure power supply recovery mechanisms to avoid providing for double-recovery of certain power supply costs. For utilities operating in areas of the country that have restructured electricity markets, only the regulated distribution business is decoupled. Utilities that also provide gas services may have their gas distribution business operating under revenue regulation as well.

Test Year

One consideration in establishing the revenue requirement is what period of time will be used as a “test period” or “test year.” The test year is the year on which the Commission will base its computations of the utility’s total costs and sales levels. A historic test year uses actual data on sales and costs from a past year. Whereas a historic test year allows for the use of actual cost data, it cannot account for expected variations in sales. A future test year requires assumptions to be made about a utility’s sales in a future year. This can allow expected changes in sales, like those from energy efficiency programs, to be included in sales projections: however, because regulators are relying on estimates provided by the utility, there may be a greater risk for inaccuracy. A Commission may also choose to use a test year that includes both past and future periods. This may provide a sense of balance between historic and future data. Furthermore, as the case proceeds, the Commission can require the utility to substitute historical data for projected data from the test year.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Year Used</th>
<th>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</th>
<th>Idaho Power Company</th>
<th>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</th>
<th>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</th>
<th>National Grid</th>
<th>Hawaiian Electric Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Future test year</td>
<td>Future test year</td>
<td>Historic test year</td>
<td>Hybrid test year</td>
<td>Future test year</td>
<td>Historic test year</td>
<td>Future test year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Unit Included in the Revenue Regulation Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho Power Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Electric Company</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Rate of Return

As in any rate case, regulators must determine the appropriate rate of return that a utility can earn on its investments, including the cost of debt and the allowed ROE for its shareholders. The approved ROE is only used to establish the return on investments that are included in the rate base when determining revenue require-
mments. Although revenue regulation ensures that a utility recovers no more or less than its target revenue, revenue regulation does not guarantee that the utility will earn the authorized ROE. Depending on how a utility manages its costs between rate cases, it will realize an actual ROE either higher (in the case of reduced costs) or lower (in the case of increased costs) than the authorized level.\(^{47}\)

A utility's allowed ROE generally represents the return deemed necessary to attract investment considering the level of risk of that investment. Riskier investments require a higher return to attract investors and vice versa. Utility earnings can be volatile because of short-run impacts on sales volumes and revenues, which include changes in sales owing to weather, economic conditions, and energy efficiency and DG programs. This volatility typically causes utilities to retain a higher level of equity in their capital structures so that reduced revenues do not leave them unable to service their debt. Revenue regulation can reduce this volatility by stabilizing revenues regardless of the cause. Because of this reduced risk, many stakeholders have proposed that the implementation of a revenue regulation mechanism be associated with a corresponding reduction in the utility's equity capital ratio (the percentage of capital supplied by common equity). This reflects the utility's more stable revenue owing to revenue regulation and reduces the overall revenue requirement that will be recovered from consumers.\(^{48}\)

An alternative option to reducing the utility's equity ratio is to reduce the ROE, reflecting a lower risk level. For the utilities included in these case studies, only BGE and Mass Electric experienced a reduction in their ROE. The Commission did not reduce BGE's ROE at the time the revenue regulation mechanism was implemented, but reduced it by 50 basis points during the subsequent rate case. The Massachusetts Commission did not reveal its adjustment, but incorporated a lowered ROE into its decision.

Absent an explicit adjustment to the cost of capital, investors' expectations will adjust to the presence of revenue regulation if its presence is reliable. The more stable earnings will likely, in time, contribute to a higher credit rating. That in turn will lead to lower cost debt that will be revealed in future cost of capital calculations. An adjustment to the ROE or capital structure by the regulator in a rate proceeding will be reflected immediately in lower rates to consumers; simply allowing the utility's credit rating to improve over time, and its cost of debt to decline, will have the same effect, but on a lagged basis, as new bonds are issued at lower interest rates.\(^{49}\)

Beginning in 2004, Standard and Poor's began publishing “risk profiles” for utilities, which classified utilities based on their earnings variability and other risks; those with more stable earnings were determined eligible for higher bond ratings at any given equity capitalization ratio (or, alternatively, able to retain a given bond rating with a lower equity ratio).\(^{50}\) One utility with a revenue regulation mechanism, Northwest Natural Gas, was believed to have had their business risk profile upgraded by one step in response to the benefits of the mechanism.\(^{51}\)

### Effect on Bond Ratings

Revenue regulation stabilizes a utility's revenue streams, reducing risk to investors; this reduced risk may be a contributing factor in an increase in a utility's bond rating. Bond rating agencies have recognized that revenue regulation mechanisms and other mechanisms that reduce net earnings volatility and risk contribute to a lower cost of capital for the utility.\(^{52}\) Standard and Poor's has explicitly stated that it “views decoupling as a positive develop-

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\(^{47}\) In a rate case, the Commission determines an allowed return on equity. This is used to set a price (price regulation) or an allowed revenue requirement (revenue regulation). Once set, however, the actual return earned by the utility is affected by anything that changes either revenue or expenses; for example, an increase in employee compensation, a change in the number of employees, or, under price regulation, a change in sales volumes.

\(^{48}\) Lazar et al., 2011.

\(^{49}\) Lazar et al., 2011.


\(^{52}\) Lazar et al., 2011.
Customer Classes Included

When determining the target revenue for a utility revenue regulation mechanism, regulators must also consider which customer classes to include in the mechanism. In some cases, industrial customers have objected to a revenue regulation mechanism. This is due to the wide difference in rates among customers, making the design of a revenue regulation mechanism more challenging. If regulators choose to exclude a class of customers from revenue regulation, they must determine the revenue requirement associated with serving only the included customer classes. This generally requires a detailed cost of service study to ensure that revenue responsibility is accurately allocated by customer class.

Included Costs

Finally, regulators may wish to exclude specific costs from the overall revenue requirement if those costs will be tracked through another mechanism, like fuel costs in a PCA mechanism, energy efficiency program expenditures, or smart grid costs, for example. Separate tracking mechanisms can also be used for those costs that are difficult to project based on historical data or costs over which the utility has very little control, like fuel costs. Although revenue regulation tracks collected revenue, mechanisms like Fuel Adjustment Clauses, Purchased Power Adjustments, and Energy Efficiency Riders can be designed to track actual costs as well as collected revenue.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs Excluded From Revenue Regulation Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho Power Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Electric Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This topic raises a note of caution: if mechanisms are not well designed, double-recovery of costs can occur for vertically integrated utilities that provide both power supply and distribution services. For example, if a per-customer revenue regulation mechanism includes investment-related power supply costs in the revenue-per-customer formula, but excludes fuel and purchased power costs that are recovered through a separate tracking mechanism, double recovery of some power supply costs is likely. If the utility experiences customer and sales growth, the amount it recovers for investment-related power supply costs will go up. However, if that utility serves this growth by operating existing power plants more, by selling less power on the surplus market, or by purchasing power from other suppliers, it will not incur any increases in the type of power sup-

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ply costs accounted for in the revenue per customer (RPC) calculation. The increased power supply costs to serve that growth will be recovered through the fuel and purchased power tracking mechanism. The net effect for the utility will be to recover incremental power supply costs twice—once in the per-customer mechanism, and again in the fuel and purchased power mechanism. It is essential to make sure that the other adjustment mechanisms do not overlap the cost impacts that are treated in the revenue regulation mechanism. One way to do this is to ensure that all power supply costs (investment, labor, fuel, purchased power) are recovered through a single mechanism. There are several ways to achieve this:

a) A comprehensive power supply recovery mechanism that includes all power supply costs, that is separate from the costs treated in the revenue regulation adjustment (e.g., Puget Sound Energy, Washington State)

b) No power supply adjustment whatsoever, with all utility costs included in an RPC mechanism (e.g., National Grid)

c) An annual attrition calculation, with all costs reviewed for changes since the last proceeding (e.g., HECO)

Revenue Adjustment Mechanism in Revenue Regulation

A RAM\(^4\) is not necessary to achieve revenue regulation, but provides attrition relief—increasing authorized revenue commensurate with increased costs—between rate cases. Whereas revenue regulation sets a target revenue that the utility will earn regardless of sales levels, the RAM adjusts the target revenue between rate cases. Regulators may choose to take several different approaches to RAM:

- **No RAM.** Regulators may choose not to implement a RAM, leaving the revenue requirement unchanged between rate cases. This requires the utility to request a rate case when it requires additional revenue to cover its costs.

- **Stairstep.** Stairstep adjustments provide predetermined increases in target revenue. These increases can be determined during a rate case and generally reflect forecasts of cost growth.

- **Indexing.** Indexing ties adjustments to the target revenue to multiple factors like inflation, productivity, customer growth, and changes in capital expenditures.

- **RPC.** The RPC approach is a form of indexing. RPC adjusts the total revenue requirement for the number of customers served. Regulators using an RPC mechanism will determine the revenue requirement per customer and the overall revenue requirement will be determined by multiplying the total number of customers by the revenue requirement per customer. The amount of revenue required to serve each customer can be determined separately for customer classes and for existing and new customers. This way, the RPC method accounts for a utility’s growth in fixed costs that is related to growth in the number of customers served. RPC is useful where the correlation between cost growth and customer growth is significant. It also protects customers from making up the deficit if there is a loss in customer load, such as if a large business closes down or relocates.

- **Hybrid.** Hybrid RAMs generally use stairstep increases to account for projected capital costs and indexing to account for O&M expenses.

Adjustments from any type of RAM can be implemented automatically or through an attrition proceeding. Some stakeholders oppose adjustments to the revenue requirement outside of a rate case on the basis that this could allow the revenue requirement to increase significantly without examination of the impact on ratepayers or without due consideration of other costs and revenues. For this reason, some regulators choose to cap the total adjustment that can be made to the revenue requirement outside of a rate case.

**Table 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Revenue Adjustment Mechanism</th>
<th>Example Utility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</td>
<td><strong>Hybrid</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho Power Company</td>
<td>RPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</td>
<td>RPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</td>
<td>RPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Grid</td>
<td><strong>No RAM; potential capital expenditure adjustment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Electric Company</td>
<td><strong>Hybrid</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) We use the RAM term applied in Hawaii here to address any type of attrition or similar mechanism, other than a revenue-per-customer framework, that changes the allowed revenue between general rate cases.
Calculation of Actual Revenue

Regulators have options when ensuring that actual revenue equals target revenue under revenue regulation. First, regulators must decide how to determine “actual revenue.” In most cases, actual revenue simply equals the amount of revenue a utility collects from its customers. The Idaho Public Utilities Commission, however, has chosen to use weather-normalized revenues as the basis for utility revenues in revenue regulation. Although this prevents the utility from recovering revenue lost to it owing to milder than expected weather, it further complicates the revenue regulation mechanism and reduces its risk-reduction benefits. By the same token, if weather is severe and increases sales above the revenue requirements, weather normalization would allow the utility to retain some of the revenues.

Next, regulators must determine whether to implement revenue regulation using a current or accrual method.

- **Current Method.** With the current method of revenue regulation, the target revenue for a period, say a month, is divided by the actual sales in that period to determine the rate per kWh. The current method ensures that actual revenue equals target revenue by calculating the rate at the end of the period so that the target revenue can be recovered. The current method allows for no lag in revenue recovery. One effect of this method is that, although customer rates vary, total bills are generally more stable. For example, in a hotter than expected July, customers will purchase more kWh, but they will be charged a lower rate. A milder than average winter would lead to fewer sales, but at slightly increased rates. This way, customers do not experience the same bill variability as they would if rates were set before the sales deviations occurred. On the other hand, the current method does not provide customers with the ability to plan ahead based on a predictable rate for electricity. This method has been used for revenue regulation of natural gas utilities.55

- **Accrual Method.** Under the accrual method, rates are set based on an assumed sales level and the differences between actual and target revenue are allowed to accrue over some period. Then the total difference between actual and target revenue is reconciled through an adjustment to rates in the subsequent period; this is known as the true-up process. Presently all revenue regulation mechanisms for electric utilities use the accrual method.56

If regulators use the accrual method of revenue regulation, they will next need to determine the period over which the difference between actual and target revenue will be allowed to accrue. One year is typical; however, shorter periods are also used. Next the frequency of comparing collected revenue to target revenue should be determined. It is possible to do this comparison only once at the end of the accrual period. It is common, however, for comparisons to occur more frequently, often monthly. When revenues are compared within the accrual period, the differences are tracked, generally for the purpose of applying interest to the difference that will be deferred until the end of the accrual period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6</th>
<th>Tracking and Accrual of Difference Between Actual and Authorized Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Track Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho Power Company</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Grid</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Electric Company</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rate Adjustments

In designing a revenue regulation mechanism, there are a number of decision points that regulators need to consider to balance the interests of all the stakeholders. One of the decision points revolves around the determination of the mechanism used to adjust rates. The issues that regulators need to consider include the following:

1. **Rate Case Requirements.** One of the often-mentioned concerns about surcharges, especially when they are numerous, is how that will impact the frequency of rate cases. For regulators and stakeholders, rate cases provide

55 Because this method results in changes in the price for service that are calculated after that service has been provided, it fails the “no retroactive ratemaking” statutes that guide most electricity regulators. Customers are entitled to know the price of the commodity they are consuming at the time they use it.

56 The closest to a current method in use for electric utilities in the BGE system of monthly reconciliation.
the best mechanism to correctly align rates and costs, but they are time-consuming and expensive for all parties. This is because a rate case presents an opportunity to closely examine all of the utility's expenses and adjust rates to reflect cost increases and decreases. Because under a revenue regulation mechanism the goal is to match revenues received from all customers with revenue requirements, a correct determination of revenue requirements is important, as is the specification of appropriate cost indices to adjust the revenue requirements. As the time between rate cases increases, some regulators feel the base rate case data, even with adjustments, need to be reexamined. As a result, some regulators have chosen to mandate the frequency of rate cases to address this, whereas others have not. It may be that in some cases, where there are numerous surcharges recovering a multitude of costs, there may not be as many costs subject to review in the rate case, making it less significant to a regulator than a case in which most costs are being analyzed and recovered in the rate case itself.

2. Collection Mechanism. Integrially tied to the mechanism for recovering revenues is how the utility will collect or refund the revenues. Options that are available include recovery through a rate case or periodic adjustments to rates through a surcharge mechanism. As can be seen by the case studies, depending on the plan in place, some utilities have very discreet requirements dictating the frequency of rate cases with adjustments occurring in those cases or between those cases. Other utilities have no requirements upon them with respect to the frequency of rate case filings. This will be discussed in more detail below. What does emerge from these case studies is that the discreet components or choices in how to execute a revenue regulation plan are carefully interwoven to create a holistic approach. Each component works with the other and the value of this case study is in examining the different pathways that can be chosen. As discussed previously, some of the commissions have authorized revenue regulation to recover the revenue requirements in the last rate case, whereas others have authorized adjustments to rates between rate cases; this impacts the pathway that the adjustment mechanism takes.

3. Timing. How often should rates be adjusted to true up to the utility's revenue requirement. States have chosen different options ranging from monthly to annually.

4. Allocation of Revenue Regulation Revenue Surpluses or Deficits. There are a number of decision points regarding allocation. Should the revenue regulation apply to all rate classes or just the smaller customers whose usage per customer and load variations are not as dramatic as those of larger-use customer classes? Should there be a different allocation to each rate class or should the allocation of costs among the classes be the same? Different mechanisms accomplish different goals. Some states have allocated revenue regulation revenues based on the revenues lost by customer class as a result of energy efficiency. This can sometimes be a political decision to mitigate opposition to energy efficiency programs by large customers. Other states recognize that the system savings resulting from energy efficiency benefit all customers, so that all customers should pay equally.

5. Carrying Charges. Depending on the timing issue discussed previously, regulators may want to consider carrying charges on any adjustments. This should be symmetrical in its application, however, so that it applies to surcharges and refunds. Consideration should be given for the basis of the carrying charge rate, whether weighted average cost of capital, rate of return, a risk-free rate, or some other mechanism should be adopted.

6. Rate Caps. In order to mitigate potential rate impacts, a regulator may want to consider a cap on how much rates can go up when the revenue regulation adjustment is made. This might be more critical if the regulator is aware of other potential rate increases that will impact customers' bills. If a cap is used, the case in which the utility's adjustment would exceed the cap must be considered. Some regulators have opted to allow the utility to carry over the excess unrecovered amount for a period of years, whereas others do not. This allows the utility to recover those revenues in a subsequent year when perhaps the adjustment is less. As a practical matter however, adjustments of greater than three percent are less common, as shall be discussed later.

7. Impact on At-Risk Consumers. Low-income and consumer advocates have expressed concern about revenue regulation as a vehicle for annual rate increases without the scrutiny of a general rate case, creating rate increases for the low-use customers doing the most to constrain usage and help achieve targeted energy savings. One proposal to address this has been to impose any resulting surcharges only to above-average usage
customers, and any resulting credits only to below-average usage.\(^{57}\)

**Rate Case Requirement**

Requirements as to the frequency of rate cases can be tied to the recovery mechanism or to the entire regulatory framework for implementing revenue regulation. In the cases studied, two of the utilities require periodic rate cases: PG&E every three years and WPS every year. Two others, National Grid and HECO, require annual mini rate cases, explained later, in which adjustments are made, and two others, IPC and BGE, have no requirements for scheduled rate cases. Nevertheless, if the concern is to ensure that the utility’s revenue recovery meets its revenue requirements, some kind of periodic rate case to examine costs is appropriate. Having periodic rate cases can provide a measure of assurance to consumer advocates that the level at which the revenues, and hence the rates, are set, is correct. One of the criticisms of revenue regulation is in fact the lack of rate cases to produce a proper level of confidence in the allowed amounts. Multiple surcharges are usually additive to existing rates, therefore not permitting an opportunity to reduce the base rate for reductions in cost. Moreover, the infrequency in cases impedes the examination of rate allocations as would occur through a cost of service study.

This is a particular issue where utilities are augmenting power supply with purchased power from independent power producers, which is the most common method for acquiring wind and solar production today. The increased cost for purchased power may flow through a fuel and purchased power adjustment mechanism, while the (depreciating) investment in conventional power plants remains static in base rates.

Both PG&E and WPS use a future test year that allows the utility to project revenue requirements during the time period that the rates are to be in effect. The benefit to this is that it can help identify and account for projected changes in costs over the timeframe between rate cases. However, given that these costs are utility projections, most consumer advocates have less confidence in these numbers than they would using actual numbers from a historical or only hybrid test year.\(^{58}\) When trying to garner support for revenue regulation from more skeptical stakeholders, using a future test year may not be helpful. Furthermore, in the case of WPS that has annual rate cases, a future test year becomes less justifiable, as revenues are recalculated annually anyway.

The absence of a rate case requirement can also cause consternation among detractors of revenue regulation because of the belief that the utility will be guaranteed its revenue requirements for as long as it is satisfied with that level, irrespective of how well it manages. However, this is no different from the status quo in traditional regulation in most places. The incentive to manage well is always there with or without revenue regulation as it translates into more profit for the utility.

In the cases of HECO and National Grid, the mini rate cases serve two purposes. In the one instance, it serves as a means to reconcile revenue recovery with revenue requirements, and in the second instance, it provides an opportunity to adjust rates in accordance with changes in costs. Specifically, for National Grid, the revenue requirement is adjusted to reflect capital expenditures. For HECO, revenues are adjusted to reflect changes in the cost of service. In the two examples here, revenue regulation is wrapped in with other adjustments as part of a mini adjustment. Given the structure for determining revenue requirements, which accounts for changes in costs, including revenue regulation within the mini rate cases is a workable option.

These examples highlight how rate cases can be used to adjust revenue requirements either in a more controlled regulatory environment with frequent rate cases or left to the utility’s discretion to decide when to adjust costs. A set schedule of periodic rate cases, such as that used by PG&E, may strike an appropriate balance for reviewing revenue requirements, however, with the modification of a partial historical partial forecasted test year. Frequent rate cases can, depending on the resources of the regulator and stakeholders, be too costly and time-intensive. When there are too many rate cases, stakeholders and regulators may not be able to dedicate the level of resources needed for any one proceeding and may be spread too thin. Regular known rate cases at reasonable intervals may strike the best balance of adequate review and adjustment of revenue requirements.

---


\(^{58}\) The most common criticism of future test years is that utilities forecast costs under an assumption that all authorized personnel positions will be filled, while in retrospect, any large organization has some level of vacancy in its employee count. A historic test year captures this effect fully.
Collection Mechanism and Timing

The collection mechanism for the differential between actual and authorized revenue requirements varies by utility as well. Both PG&E and WPS do not have adjustment clauses or surcharges, but instead have structured their revenue regulation plans to recover their costs in a rate case with rates adjusted annually. Although PG&E has rate cases every three years, the utility files its preliminary forecast every September 1 for the following year, including adjustments for revenue regulation and other costs. This practice promotes transparency, keeping all stakeholders aware of the current situation of the utility. IPC, BGE, National Grid, and HECO use surcharges on customer bills to collect or credit the difference between actual revenues collected and the revenue requirement. Although the other three (IPC, National Grid, and HECO) calculate the rate adjustment annually, only BGE does a more contemporaneous adjustment of one month. Certainly where there are no regularly scheduled rate cases, using an adjustment mechanism becomes more critical. PG&E has created a tracking mechanism known as a balancing account that allows the utility to track the surpluses and deficits to help ensure accuracy at year end when rates are actually adjusted. The creation of such monthly balancing accounts will make it easier at the end of the year to track what happened each month and then determine the adjustment for that year. It provides a more detailed trail for review and analysis by stakeholders and regulators. However, other mechanisms that just look at total revenues as compared to revenue requirements at the end of the year can work as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate Case Requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Idaho Power Company</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>National Grid</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Hawaiian Electric Company</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate Adjustments</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Idaho Power Company</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</strong></td>
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<td><strong>National Grid</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Hawaiian Electric Company</strong></td>
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</table>

Allocation of Revenue Regulation Revenue Surpluses or Deficits

The allocation of revenue regulation revenue surpluses or deficits should be symmetrical so that overpayments are credited to customers just as underpayments are paid by those same customers. The six utilities studied follow that formula. The application of revenue regulation, however, varies from utility to utility. BGE and IPC apply revenue regulation to the residential and commercial classes, thereby excluding industrial customers. In contrast, however, PG&E, WPS, National Grid, and HECO allocate revenue regulation adjustments to all customer classes. In terms of how the costs are allocated, IPC, BGE, WPS, National Grid, and HECO allocate costs differently among the customer classes. PG&E, however, allocates costs uniformly among the customers. Because PG&E has separated its business units, it also separately calculates and allocates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocation of Surplus or Deficit</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Idaho Power Company</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>National Grid</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Hawaiian Electric Company</strong></td>
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</table>
revenue regulation surpluses and deficits among its electric distribution, gas distribution, and electric generation businesses. This illustrates that there are several ways to address revenues from revenue regulation depending on the policy outcomes that are desired.

**Carrying Charges**

Carrying charges applied to uncollected or surplus revenues can be used to account for the time value of money and the lost opportunity or value to having those revenues in hand. PG&E and BGE do not accrue carrying charges. On the other hand, IPC, WPS, National Grid, and HECO do. For BGE, given that the revenue regulation revenues are reconciled and recovered monthly, it would make little sense to include a carrying cost. Where carrying costs have been used, they have included in the cases of these utilities the short-term debt rate or the customer deposit rate, which for one utility is six percent and probably close to the short-term debt rate. Thus, the carrying charge rates are appropriately at the lower end of the spectrum reflecting their short-term nature. In the application of the carrying charge, symmetry should be preserved by applying it to both deficits and surpluses. Application of carrying charges given the short period that costs are carried (one year) is somewhat discretionary. Although it does more accurately account for costs, it does add a modest level of complication in tracking costs.

**Table 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carrying Charges</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Idaho Power Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Grid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Electric Company</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Rate Caps and Collars**

One of the ways to protect customers in the event of significant adjustments is to impose a rate cap (or collar) that limits the amount of a rate increase (and decrease). Some customers are sensitive to changes in foundational costs like utility bills and if costs are going to rise, they benefit from a pattern of steady modest increases rather than a large step increase. Any structural increases in rates attributable to reductions in sales or increases in costs recognized by the revenue regulation plan would be eventually included in rates under any system. A cap reflects a controlled way to manage customer expectations and customer impacts. Structural changes can only be managed for a while until a complete rate case is needed to reset all assumptions.

Typically, when a rate cap is imposed, if the formulaic increase exceeds the cap or collar, the utility will be able to carry over any uncollected revenues until the next rate adjustment. Two of the utilities studied, PG&E and HECO, do not have rate caps. On the other hand, the other four utilities do include rate caps in varying amounts. National Grid has a one-percent revenue cap, whereas IPC and BGE have a one-percent and a ten-percent rate cap, respectively. WPS, unlike the others, has a cap tied to the dollar amount of $14 million as opposed to a percentage. Consistent with the goals of revenue regulation, all of the utilities studied have a carryover provision that is important for reducing the risk that the utility will not recover its revenue requirements.

Note that National Grid differs from BGE and HECO in that its cap is on revenues, whereas the other two utilities cap rates and rate impacts. A revenue cap is more focused on ensuring minimal change to the revenue requirements authorized by the commission. National Grid, as discussed previously, allows for mini rate cases to adjust the revenue requirements. Having the one-percent cap limits the amount of increase that can occur through that process, requiring revenue changes that are greater to occur in a full rate case. However, note also that some of the adjustments allowed in the mini rate case have their own separate cap. The IPC rate cap is in line with what many other utilities with caps have in place, which generally range from one to three percent. The ten-percent rate cap in the BGE plan is

**Table 11**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cap on Rate Adjustment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Idaho Power Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Grid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Electric Company</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
reflective of its monthly adjustment pattern. An annual adjustment allows more time to smooth out peaks and valleys in revenues, whereas a monthly adjustment will be influenced by more of the spikes (particularly weather-driven variation), thus the need for a larger bandwidth for the carryover. Like a variable energy rate or fuel adjustment clause that fluctuates monthly, the monthly adjustment introduces more volatility into the rates.

**Actual Historical Adjustments**

For many ratepayer advocates there is a concern that some of the utility management risk will be transferred to customers as a consequence of a policy that seeks to ensure that the utility will be made whole. However, the utility retains management risk and the requirement to demonstrate that it has acted prudently. Thus the utility still has just as much of an incentive to operate efficiently as it did without revenue regulation. If the utility can lower its costs, it can still increase its profits. Second, by designing rates symmetrically such that under- and over-recoveries are reconciled, it provides customers with an opportunity to obtain credits that under traditional regulation would be retained by the utility. It has often been opined that when there are large gaps in time between utility rate cases, it is because the utility is over-earning and exceeding its revenue requirements. In those instances, customers never get to examine what the utility is collecting, much less receive a refund. Under revenue regulation, with its periodic adjustments and scheduled general rate cases, the revenue requirements are examined and refunds or credits allocated, such that customers have a better knowledge base for understanding the utility's earnings. And annual reconciliation of the utility's actual revenues versus authorized revenues provides consumers with a tool to reign in excess revenue recovery beyond authorized amounts. Third, the adjustments that do occur under revenue regulation are manageable and frequently less than the adjustments customers are used to seeing on their bills for fuel or variable generation rates, or for the myriad of other surcharges that can be tacked on to a customer's bill, such as an infrastructure (smart grid) surcharge, maintenance upgrade fee, regulatory asset charge, or system benefit charge.

As seen in Figure 1, the range of rate impacts cluster around plus or minus two percent, but can at times exceed plus or minus five percent. The total of surcharges has somewhat exceeded the total of credits.

**Figure 1**

![Total Utility Decoupling Adjustment Rate Impacts](image)

---

As can be seen with the utilities studied above, the larger fluctuations are attributable to adjustment mechanisms that are reconciled more frequently, such as monthly, as those are less able to smooth out anomalies as an annual adjustment would do. From a dollar perspective, for the roughly 64 percent of adjustments that fall within the plus or minus two-percent range, the monthly bill impact is approximately $2.30 for average electric customers and $1.40 for average gas customers.\(^{60}\)

Of the six utilities studied, the fluctuations in adjustment have for the most part stayed within the one- to three-percent range as shown below.

- PG&E from 2005 to 2012 has had annual revenue regulation adjustments ranging from −1.43 percent to 4.15 percent, with an average adjustment of 1.97 percent.
- For IPC, the adjustments are separated between residential and commercial customers. For residential customers, the annual adjustments from 2007 through 2011 ranged from 0.77 percent to 2.58 percent for an average of 1.62 percent. As for the commercial customers, the annual adjustments for that same period were higher, ranging from 1.04 percent to 4.24 percent, with an average adjustment of 2.52 percent.
- BGE has monthly adjustments that ranged from −1.853 percent to 3.013 percent, with an average of 0.57 percent for residential customers from March 2008 through August 2012. For General Service Customers, the monthly adjustment ranged from −2.264 percent to 2.462 percent. The average adjustment was 1.308 percent.
- For WPS, the annual adjustments from 2009 through 2011 ranged from −1.45 percent to 3.78 percent for residential and small commercial, and from −3.14 percent to 8.99 percent for commercial. Note that because of a $14 million per year cap, some of these percentages were carried over. The average annual adjustment for residential and small commercial and for commercial was 1.63 percent and 2.15 percent, respectively, with carry-overs to subsequent years.
- For Massachusetts Electric and Nantucket Electric, both of which operate under National Grid, the annual revenue regulation adjustment for all for 2011 and 2012 was −0.105 percent and 0.315 percent, for an average revenue regulation adjustment over the two years of 0.105 percent.
- HECO, like National Grid, has one annual revenue regulation mechanism for its customers, which resulted in adjustments in 2011 and 2012 of 0.63 percent and 1.07 percent, respectively, for an average adjustment of 0.85 percent.

As can be gleaned from the above information, the range of average adjustments for small use customers was a low of 0.105 percent for National Grid to a high of 1.97 percent for PG&E. For larger use customers, the range was a low of 0.105 percent for National Grid to a high of 2.52 percent for IPC. This demonstrates that on average for these utilities with well-developed and diversely designed revenue regulation proposals, their adjustments on average stayed at or below approximately 2.5 percent.

One of the metrics for determining if a revenue regulation program is working successfully that was discussed above was the impact on rates of a revenue regulation mechanism. As can be seen by the analysis of the adjustment levels for each of the utilities, they are within a reasonable range.

**Complementary Policies**

Although a revenue regulation mechanism does not need to be accompanied by other policies, energy efficiency is frequently at the root of the reason revenue regulation was proposed in the first place. The states examined in this paper have various obligations for energy efficiency achievement placed upon their utilities. Only Idaho does not have an Energy Efficiency Resource Standard, but energy efficiency objectives are developed through an integrated resource plan process. Energy efficiency spending at IPC has increased dramatically in recent years.\(^{61}\)

In recognition of the fact that revenue regulation only removes the disincentive to pursue energy efficiency, several states have instituted some form of incentives to reward the desired outcome. This mechanism can not only incentivize management to aggressively pursue energy efficiency, but also make shareholders supportive in the face of lost investment opportunity.

Rate design can also play an important part in assisting the utility in achieving favorable energy efficiency outcomes. Inclining block rates penalize inefficient use of electricity and shorten payback times from the customer perspective. Because efficiency reduces consumption at

\(^{60}\) Id, p 3.

the tail block rate, the value of kWh savings is greater than with flat rates. On the other side of the spectrum, declining block rates, which have a reduced rate in the tail block, do little to encourage conservation. In fact, they operate more like a discounted bulk rate by reducing the average cost of a kWh in a customer’s bill for the more kWh used.

Performance incentives or other ways to avoid destructive cost-cutting in the name of creating margins that reduce service or reliability or lessen customer value have been implemented only in Massachusetts of the six utilities illustrated here. Several other states have implemented various schemes in reaction to perceived deficiencies in utility service. Performance incentives are not unique to revenue regulation. Commissions wishing to implement such a scheme can find many models of incentive reward and penalty mechanisms developed for other purposes.

Taken together, a suite of policy and program features can create an atmosphere that is conducive to achievement of energy efficiency goals within the utility and for the customers. By appropriate application of these techniques, regulators, working with utilities and stakeholders, can remove barriers and create an opportunity for energy efficiency to be fully integrated into the utility supply option portfolio.

**Energy Efficiency Outcomes**

Although revenue regulation itself does not create an incentive for a utility to implement energy efficiency, it does address the issue of lost revenues associated with energy efficiency and DG programs. Revenue regulation should be combined with other mechanisms that require or incentivize the implementation of energy efficiency by the utility or a third party. The level of energy efficiency achieved can be one measure of the success of a revenue regulation mechanism as implemented in a larger program designed to achieve energy efficiency. Table 13 shows the incremental annual energy efficiency savings reported by each utility, with the shaded box indicating the year that the utility’s revenue regulation mechanism was implemented. National Grid had achieved a high level of energy efficiency savings in the years before it implemented revenue regulation.

This paper has not evaluated DG outcomes to correlate with revenue regulation, as it is not perceived that states and utilities have made that connection expressly in historical mechanisms. However, it is expected that this connec-

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**Table 12**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complementary Policies for Energy Efficiency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency Requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Idaho Power Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Grid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Electric Company</td>
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62 Optional rate designs for PG&E include TOU and Peak Time Pricing.
63 IPC also has an optional TOU rate design.
64 Optional rate designs for this utility include TOU, Critical Peak Pricing, and Contract.
65 National Grid also offers optional TOU and flat rate designs.
66 HECO also offers optional TOU and flat rate designs.
Decoupling Case Studies: Revenue Regulation Implementation in Six States

### Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Incremental Energy Efficiency Savings as Percentage of Retail Sales[^68]</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idaho Power Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore Gas &amp; Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Public Service Corporation[^70]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Electric Company[^71]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^68]: Highlighted cells are the year that utility started decoupling.

...will be made in future mechanisms, and furthermore it is anticipated that follow on work to this paper will want to study that connection between revenue regulation and DG performance.

### Conclusions

An increasing number of states are looking to increase the rate of energy efficiency investments for their long-run cost and risk advantages. The benefits of energy efficiency include not only its ability to reduce system costs across the distribution, transmission, and generation functions, but also the opportunity for customers to reduce their individual energy costs for their own electric bills. Nevertheless, it is counterintuitive to encourage or order a utility to sell less of its product. In order to encourage the proliferation of energy efficiency programs as a solution that can contribute to this nation’s energy needs, this tension between the goals of society versus the goals of the utility needs to be addressed. Revenue regulation can be such a solution by removing the link between sales and revenues.

There are many ways to implement revenue regulation and multiple decision points that regulators must consider in designing a revenue regulation mechanism. This paper focused on six utilities, each of which implemented revenue regulation in different ways in accordance with the objectives of that state. Different decision points discussed include:

- Should there be symmetry such that a reconciliation adjustment occurs for both over- and under-recoveries of the revenue requirements?
- Should recovery of indicated surcharges be conditioned on acceptable performance on customer service quality or energy efficiency goals?
- Should there be an attrition adjustment to account for other expenses, or should the revenue regulation adjustment be limited to reconciling existing revenue requirements?
- Should there be an inflation adjustment?
- To calculate the revenue requirements, should the current or accrual method be used?
- Should the adjustments be made in rate cases or through a rider?
- How frequently should adjustments be made: monthly, annually, or some other time period?
- Depending on the period of time between true up and recovery, should there be carrying charges, and if so, how should they be calculated?

[^68]: EIA. Form EIA-861 data files. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/

[^69]: PG&E began revenue regulation in 1974 and it was later suspended and recommenced in 2001.

[^70]: WPS savings are represented by the statewide program savings from the Focus on Energy program. WPS provided additional funds to Focus on Energy, starting in CY10, through their territory-wide program activities.

[^71]: In 2009, Hawaii Energy, a ratepayer-funded statewide energy efficiency provider, began delivering services. Savings reported after 2009 represent savings achieved through the programs of Hawaii Energy.
Decoupling Case Studies: Revenue Regulation Implementation in Six States

• Should there be a requirement authorizing the frequency of rate case?
• Should there be an annual cap on the amount of the adjustment, and if so, should there be an opportunity to carry over any additional amounts and for how many years?
• Should there be an adjustment to the cost of capital to reflect the reduced risk?

Other considerations for regulators, whether or not they implement revenue regulation, but certainly as part of a comprehensive package, are other measures that can be put in place to encourage consumers and utilities alike to actively participate in energy efficiency. For example, an inclining block rate structure by virtue of its incentive to consume less pairs well with an energy efficiency program, helps drive consumers to participate in efficiency programs, and accelerates the payback of an energy efficiency investment. By the same token, an incentive payment to the utility helps provide its management with a good reason to excel and exceed targets for energy efficiency programs.

A key point illustrated by the list of considerations above is that there is not just one static way to design and implement revenue regulation, but rather there are a variety of options for doing so. In this study, a diverse group of utilities were reviewed. The differences among the utilities included geographic diversity, vertically integrated and restructured utilities, different levels of energy efficiency in place, and certainly differences in how the revenue regulation mechanisms were implemented. No two utilities were alike and no two utilities had the same revenue regulation mechanism. The key is that revenue regulation should eliminate the throughput incentive, but the means for accomplishing this goal can vary and be tailored to each jurisdiction and each utility and still be successful.

There are several considerations in the design of a revenue regulation mechanism that can help ensure its successful adoption. To begin, revenue regulation should be granted to utilities only as a precondition to implementing comprehensive energy efficiency and/or DG policies. Unless accompanied by a commitment to engage in providing least-cost resource options that could impact sales, there is not really any good policy reason for its adoption. All of the utilities studied are actively engaging in energy efficiency. Furthermore, as a matter of fairness, the revenue regulation mechanism should be symmetrical so that any revenues above those authorized are refunded back to consumers. This is the bargain. Barring imprudence or other unforeseen circumstances, the utility receives its authorized revenue requirements and nothing more or less under a simple revenue regulation mechanism.

Rate design plays an important role in the effectiveness of energy efficiency in concert with revenue regulation. A low customer charge is preferable so that the customer can benefit from real bill reductions tied to reduced volumetric consumption. Reductions in consumption not only reduce bills but also positively impact the payback period for investments in energy efficient appliances. Declining block rates in which the tail block rate is lower than the first tier also do not encourage conservation. Inclining block rates that reward low usage in the first block with a lower rate send the better price signals. None of the six utilities studied had declining block residential rates. They were inclining, flat, and time-varying.

The revenue adjustment mechanism is also a critical decision point in terms of whether a revenue per customer mechanism is adopted that accounts for only the current revenue requirements or whether latitude is given to include an inflation adjustment or other cost increases in the revenue adjustment mechanism. Three of the utilities studied adopted this approach, whereas another two used a hybrid approach. Finally, to reduce volatility, five of the six utilities opted for annual rather than monthly adjustments, thereby creating a level of rate stability that customers in general prefer.

Once the goals for revenue regulation are set by the regulators, the next step is to design programs that will implement that goal. For energy efficiency to be as successful as possible, regulators may want to adopt a complement of other policies to accompany revenue regulation. These can include rate designs that reward reduced use and conservation as well as incentive payments to utilities that reward them for meeting or exceeding targets. Of the six utilities studied, three have adopted some form of incentive. One simple approach that was used in Washington was to link recovery of any surcharges under the revenue regulation mechanism to achievement of energy efficiency targets.\(^\text{72}\)

For the utilities examined above that have implemented revenue regulation, the evidence demonstrates that revenue regulation as a strategy and a mechanism to enable

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energy efficiency has been working well. The fact that each revenue regulation mechanism varies from the next demonstrates that there are many different paths that can be followed in implementing revenue regulation based on the needs of the utility and its stakeholders in a particular region. This study demonstrates that revenue regulation does work and provides examples of how it can be implemented, each one different and unique because of the number of decision points to be considered in designing a revenue regulation mechanism.
### Appendix

#### Historic Rate Adjustments

**Table 14**

**PG&E Revenue Regulation Rate Adjustments 1983 to 1993**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue Regulation Adjustment as % of Total Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>(3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>(4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 15**

**PG&E Revenue Regulation Adjustments 2005 to 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Delivery Revenue Requirement ($ millions)</th>
<th>Revenue Regulation Adjustment ($ millions)</th>
<th>% of Delivery Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8925</td>
<td>-127.73</td>
<td>-1.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9933</td>
<td>224.6</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10409</td>
<td>217.27</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10261</td>
<td>40.32</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>11169</td>
<td>103.55</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11224</td>
<td>465.56</td>
<td>4.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10306</td>
<td>383.90</td>
<td>3.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>11032</td>
<td>403.04</td>
<td>3.65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 16**

**IPC Revenue Regulation Adjustments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Retail Rate</th>
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</table>

73 Lesh, P. (2009, June 30). *Rate impacts and key design elements of gas and electric utility decoupling*.
76 All numbers provided by the utility.
Figure 2

IPC Revenue Regulation Adjustments
Residential FCA Balance and Use per Customer

Residual Authorized FCA Amount

Monthly Use Per Customer (kWh)

Residual Authorized FCA Amount ($)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011


### Table 17a

**Baltimore Gas and Electric**  
*BGE Monthly Revenue Regulation Adjustments, 2008 to 2012*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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### Table 17b

**Baltimore Gas and Electric**  
*BGE Monthly Revenue Regulation Adjustments, 2008 to 2012*

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### Table 17c

**Baltimore Gas and Electric**  
*BGE Monthly Revenue Regulation Adjustments, 2008 to 2012*

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<td>Retail Rate $/kWh</td>
<td>Adjustment %</td>
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<td>Retail Rate $/kWh</td>
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<tr>
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Table 17e

**Baltimore Gas and Electric**

*BGE Monthly Revenue Regulation Adjustments, 2008 to 2012*

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<th>Retail Rate $/kWh</th>
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<td>0.1291</td>
<td>1.960%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Service</td>
<td>0.00262</td>
<td>0.1064</td>
<td>2.462%</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>0.00253</td>
<td>0.1291</td>
<td>1.960%</td>
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<td>2.462%</td>
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<td>1.960%</td>
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<td>0.1064</td>
<td>2.462%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.960%</td>
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<td>0.1064</td>
<td>2.462%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
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<td>0.1291</td>
<td>1.960%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.00262</td>
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<td>2.462%</td>
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<td>0.1291</td>
<td>1.960%</td>
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<td>0.00262</td>
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<td>July</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.960%</td>
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<td>2.462%</td>
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<td>August</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.960%</td>
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Decoupling Case Studies: Revenue Regulation Implementation in Six States

Table 18

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<th>Revenue Regulation Adjustments 2009 to 2011</th>
<th>79</th>
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<td>Derived Adjustment Capped $/kWh</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Residential/Small Commercial</td>
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<td>Residential/Small Commercial</td>
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<td>Commercial</td>
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Table 19

<table>
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<th>National Grid</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Revenue Regulation Adjustment ¢kWh</td>
<td>Retail Rate ¢kWh</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>2012 All</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>13.96</td>
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Table 20

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Hawaiian Electric Company</th>
<th>Revenue Regulation Adjustment ¢kWh</th>
<th>Retail Rate</th>
<th>Revenue Regulation %</th>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>31.49</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.3894</td>
<td>36.41</td>
<td>1.07%</td>
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“The 2011 adjustment took effect June 1 but was reduced to $0 on July 26, 2011 when the Commission granted HECO an interim rate increase of $53.2 million in a 2011 test year general rate case. The 2012 Adjustment runs from June 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013. About 25% of the total relates to the portion of the decoupling mechanism that updates O&M and rate base.” (Morgan, 2013)

Additional Resources

**Revenue Regulation and Decoupling: A Guide to Theory and Application**
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/902
This guide was prepared to assist anyone who needs to understand both the mechanics of a regulatory tool known as decoupling and the policy issues associated with its use. This would include public utility commissioners and staff, utility management, advocates and others with a stake in the regulated energy system. While this guide is somewhat technical at points, we have tried to make it accessible to a broad audience, to make comprehensible the underlying concepts and the implications of different design choices. This guide includes a detailed case study that demonstrates the impacts of decoupling using different pricing structures (rate designs) and usage patterns.

**Pricing Do’s and Don’ts: Designing Retail Rates as if Efficiency Counts**
Rate design is a crucial element of an overall regulatory strategy that fosters energy efficiency and sends appropriate signals about efficient system investment and operations. Rate design is also fully under the control of state regulators. Progressive rate design elements can guide consumers to participate in energy efficiency programs and reduce peak demand, yet relatively few utilities and commissions have implemented many of these elements. This RAP paper identifies some best practices. Because pricing issues tie closely to utility growth incentives, we also address revenue decoupling.

**A Decade of Decoupling for US Energy Utilities: Rate Impacts, Designs and Observations**
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/6356
This report, written by Pamela Morgan of Graceful Systems LLC, builds on a 2009 report. Now covering 25 states, including 49 LDCs and 24 electric utilities, this report summarizes the decoupling mechanism designs these utilities use and the rate adjustments they have made under those mechanisms. In total, this report estimates the retail rate impacts of 1,244 decoupling mechanism adjustments since 2005.

**The Role of Decoupling Where Energy Efficiency is Required by Law**
This Issuesletter gives an overview of energy efficiency resource standards, the need to decouple utility profits from utility sales, and explains why decoupling is needed even where a third party administers energy efficiency programs.

**Revenue Decoupling Standards and Criteria: A Report to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission**
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/850
In 2007, the Minnesota legislature enacted a new statute, Section 216B.2412, in which it defined an alternative approach to utility regulation, decoupling, and directed the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to “establish criteria and standards” by which decoupling could be adopted for the state’s rate-regulated utilities. To fulfill its obligation to develop criteria and standards for decoupling, the PUC sought the advice of the Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP). This report is the output of that collaboration.

**Designing Distributed Generation Tariffs Well**
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/6898
Improvements in distributed generation economics, increasing consumer preference for clean, distributed energy resources, and a favorable policy environment in many states have combined to produce significant increases in distributed generation adoption in the United States. Regulators are looking for the well-designed tariff that compensates distributed generation adopters fairly for the value they provide to the electric system, compensates the utility fairly for the grid services it provides, and charges non-participating consumers fairly for the value of the services they receive. This paper offers regulatory options for dealing with distributed generation. The authors outline current tariffs and ponder what regulators should consider as they weigh the benefits, costs, and net value to distributed generation adopters, non-adopters, the utility, and society as a whole. The paper highlights the importance of deciding upon a valuation methodology so that the presence or absence of cross-subsidies can be determined. Finally, the paper offers rate design and ratemaking options for regulators to consider, and includes recommendations for fairly implementing tariffs and ratemaking treatments to promote the public interest and ensure fair compensation.
Rate Design Where Advanced Metering Infrastructure Has Not Been Fully Deployed

http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/6516

This paper identifies sound practices in rate design applied around the globe using conventional metering technology. Rate design for most residential and small commercial customers (mass market consumers) is most often reflected in a simple monthly access charge and a per-kWh usage rate in one or more blocks and one or more seasons. A central theme across the practices highlighted in this paper is that of sending effective pricing signals through the usage-sensitive components of rates in a way that reflects the character of underlying long-run costs associated with production and usage. While new technology is enabling innovations in rate design that carry some promise of better capturing opportunities for more responsive load, the majority of the world’s electricity usage is expected to remain under conventional pricing at least through the end of the decade, and much longer in some areas. Experience to date has shown that the traditional approaches to rate design persist well after the enabling technology is in place that leads to change.

Time-Varying and Dynamic Rate Design

http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/5131

This report discusses important issues in the design and deployment of time-varying rates. The term, time-varying rates, is used in this report as encompassing traditional time-of-use rates (such as time-of-day rates and seasonal rates) as well as newer dynamic pricing rates (such as critical peak pricing and real time pricing). The discussion is primarily focused on residential customers and small commercial customers who are collectively referred to as the mass market. The report also summarizes international experience with time-varying rate offerings.